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Preface
Business entities are often faced with the problem of acquiring
new equipment or facilities. By and large, this is a two-fold prob
lem: (1) Is the investment desirable from an economic point of
view, and (2) How can the acquisition best be financed?
Analysis for Purchasing and Financing Productive Equipment is the
fourth publication in this series of technical studies in management
services.
The contents of this technical study are divided into two sections:
(1) textual material concerning the type of analysis covered by the
study, and (2) four case studies describing engagements performed
by CPAs in that area. All the case studies are based on actual
situations, although the names, locations, and, in some cases, minor
details have been changed. In a few instances the figures also have
been changed. Where this has been done, every effort has been made
to avoid distorting significant relationships.
Each case study consists of two parts: (1) a description of the
client situation as it unfolded to the practitioner, and (2) a description
of how the practitioner dealt with the situation. The cases are pre
sented in this format to enable readers to use them as a self-teaching
device.
Several questions are asked at the end of part one: questions
requiring quantitative analysis of the data in the case; questions
about how the job should be approached; questions about fee esti
mates or man-day requirements; and so forth. It is suggested that
the reader should plan to read part one carefully and prepare answers
to the questions presented before proceeding to part two. Part two
then provides an opportunity for the reader to compare his analysis
with that prepared by the practitioner.
Most management decisions do not have just one obviously right
answer. Therefore, the reader s solution to a case may frequently,
and perhaps appropriately, differ from the approach taken by the
vii

practitioner. Working through the series of cases over a period of
several weeks the management services student should find increas
ing confidence in his ability to size up a situation and devise an
approach for dealing with the particular problem area discussed
in this bulletin.
This is the fourth in a series of five technical studies prepared
under the general supervision of Professor Richard F. Vancil, D.B.A.,
CPA, Harvard Business School and Henry De Vos, manager, man
agement services. Assistance in the field research and case writing
was provided by Dr. James S. Hekimian, Dr. Charles J. Christenson,
Dr. David F. Hawkins, Dr. Robert C. Deming, Dr. Robert C. Hill,
and L. Paul Berman.

viii

Analysis for Purchasing and
Financing Productive Equipment
The acquisition of productive equipment and facilities is one of
management’s most important tasks, and the decisions involving when
to acquire how much of what type of facilities are an important class
of business decision problems. Good decisions in this area are vital to
the success of the business because (1) the amounts of money involved
may be substantial, relative to the size of the business, (2) actions
taken are not easily reversed; that is, the facilities will probably be
used for a prolonged period, and (3) perhaps most important, having
the right facilities available for the manufacture and distribution of the
company’s products may be of major significance in determining the
efficiency and competitive effectiveness of the company’s operations.
In making a decision about the acquisition of additional facilities,
the businessman must weigh the greater profits that he expects to earn
in the future against the capital investment required today in order to
earn those profits. Frequently, the problem is not so much one of
evaluating the adequacy of the expected return on the investment,
as it is of finding a method of financing the undertaking in order to
realize the greatest gain. Earlier studies in this series explored various
management problems that required the identification of relevant
costs. This same kind of analysis will be an integral part of the pro
cedures described in this bulletin. The important new dimension con
sidered in this bulletin is time and the related problem of evaluating
risk over long time spans.
The importance of time depends upon how long an investor must
1

wait between an outlay of funds and the benefits that result from that
outlay. In a sense, all business expenditures are of this nature. A
restaurant, for example, in purchasing food items during the morning
and selling them throughout the day, first experiences an investment
type outlay and then realizes a return on it. When a businessman talks
about investment decisions, however, such brief time spans are usually
ignored. A widely used, common sense rule is to regard as capital
investments only those expenditures which benefit the firm for more
than one year.
Investment decisions are important because, by their very nature,
they may affect the profitability of a business for many future periods.
A company buying new equipment or building a plant converts liquid
resources into a relatively illiquid asset. Through such a commitment,
the investor usually expects to earn a return. Nevertheless, once the
commitment is made, the die is cast. The uses to which the once liquid
resources have been put now become considerably limited.
Risk evaluation becomes a more difficult task for long-term invest
ments. Funds, committed now, are expected to accrue a return in
the future. But the future returns are indefinite, both in amount and
timing of receipt. To be sure, all estimates are the “best available,”
but they are still estimates. In a sense, the mere passage of time
compounds risks.
Risk plays another role in financing investments. The businessman
invests today and, in making financing arrangements, agrees that he
will pay certain fixed sums at prescribed predetermined intervals. His
future ability to make these payments depends to a varying degree on
the revenues which he expects to receive from the investment. Again,
these are expectations. The financing commitments, however, are fixed
and usually are hard to revise, particularly if the business gets into
financial difficulty.
The sheer size of an investment serves to increase the risk involved in
making a poor decision. In many cases, an equipment investment
involves a relatively large amount of money. W hether it be a bulldozer
for a road builder, a lathe for a small custom manufacturer, or a build
ing for a bowling alley operator, the sum of money involved is large in
relation to the other more normal business expenditures, such as wages
or rent, during the same time period. Almost by definition, therefore,
most investments involve a significant commitment of the firm’s re
sources, and the wisdom of such investments will reflect forcefully in
future operating results and the future financial condition.
The remainder of this study deals with the various problems associ
2

ANALYSIS FOR PURCHASING AND FIN A N C IN G PRODUCTIVE EQUIPMENT

ated with financing investments and various methods of evaluating
investment decisions.
Scope of this Study

Because of the importance of sound capital expenditure decisions,
the subject has received a great deal of serious thought by both busi
ness managers and scholars in the field of management science. It is
generally recognized that a well designed and well executed capital
expenditure program must include the following elements:
1. The creative, systematic search for investment opportunities.
This first step is undoubtedly the hardest one to organize, and the
businessman can never be sure that he has identified all of the alterna
tives that may be available. In contrast to subsequent steps, where
rigorous analysis and control can help to insure rational action, the
discovery of attractive opportunities is a far less precise process.
2. The measurement of the expected benefits from a specific in
vestment. Once an apparently attractive opportunity has been identi
fied, a careful investigation of its ramifications must be performed.
This includes not only predictions of quantifiable effects in terms of
future costs and revenues, but also a delineation of less tangible effects
on such things as product quality and employee morale.
3. The comparative evaluation of alternatives. If the search process
in step one has been successful, the businessman will find himself faced
with more attractive alternatives than he can accept. One limiting
factor may be the availability of funds; the business may have only a
certain amount of money that can be used for new investments, al
though new financing may be used to expand the pool of available
capital. A more important constraint may be strictly managerial; the
executives of the company can only monitor a limited number of new
investments at any one time. Thus, some opportunities can be ac
cepted while others must be rejected, and highly developed analytical
procedures are now available for evaluating alternative opportunities,
ranking them, and selecting those which make optimal use of the
company’s financial and managerial resources.
4. The control of expenditures on approved projects. The decision
to make a particular investment marks the beginning of the next phase
of the capital expenditure process: monitoring the execution of the
3

proposal to insure that the expenditures made conform to approved
plans. This may be a simple process when the investment involves
a specific piece of equipment, but it can be quite complex for an
elaborate construction project that may require two years or more
to complete.
5. The post-audit of results. The final step, easy to ignore and hard
to accomplish, is to review the results obtained from an investment
after it has been operative for an appropriate period. The value of
such a follow-up is primarily educational; if the results predicted in
step two have not been realized, a serious error may have been made,
and repetition of such errors can only be prevented if management is
aware of its past mistakes and tries to learn from them.
Each of these five steps is practically a topic unto itself, and this
bulletin makes no attempt to cover all of them. Much of the existing
literature on capital budgeting is directed to the problems of large
companies; this bulletin attempts to fill part of the gap in the literature
by addressing itself to capital expenditure problems of smaller com
panies. There are hundreds of thousands of such firms, and their
owners and managers are increasingly coming to rely on the manage
ment services expertise of their CPAs to assist them in capital expendi
ture decisions.
The problems of a small business in the capital expenditure area are
quite different from those of larger companies. Formal controls and
follow-up procedures (steps four and five above) frequently are not
necessary; the owner knows his mistakes all too well because he con
tinues to live with them every day. Similarly, the search process ( step
one), while still of critical importance, is less difficult for a small busi
ness because there is no complex hierarchical organization which may
stifle creativity. Even the comparative evaluation of alternatives ( step
three) is less complex because the number of competing projects is
smaller and the manager’s direct knowledge of his business simplifies
the ranking process. Instead, the research leading to this bulletin, and
the case studies it contains, indicate that the major problems faced by
a small business in this area are in arranging new financing to permit
the business to take advantage of an attractive opportunity, and
measuring the effects of a proposed investment.
The CPA can be of great value to a small client in these two areas,
and the remainder of this bulletin is devoted to describing how this
may be accomplished. Despite the “small client” orientation of this
4
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bulletin, the CPA still has an obligation to be well informed about the
other, equally important aspects of capital expenditure programs, and
a bibliography at the end of this chapter provides a reference list for
that purpose.

FINANCING NEW EQUIPM ENT

Many times, the problem facing the businessman with regard to the
acquisition of new equipment or facilities is not the rate of return he
might earn or the desirability of the investment, but, rather—how to
get the money! Businessmen, especially those in smaller businesses,
are often convinced of the desirability of undertaking a particular in
vestment. They know it’s a good idea, but they usually do not have the
funds with which to finance it. Frequently, the CPA can lend highly
valuable assistance to a client on the “how to raise money” problem.
There are in fact two closely related problems at this point: (1) know
ing where to go for money, and (2) justifying the acquisition of money.
Most small businessmen do not make frequent trips to commercial
banks or other lending institutions. The CPA, on the other hand, as a
normal part of his practice, experiences a great deal of exposure to
many different sources of funds. Whereas the average client might
need outside funds once or twice in five years, the CPA becomes in
volved in this search much more often during the course of his work
with various clients. Not only, therefore, is the CPA well equipped to
assist the businessman in making preparations for a visit to a local
banker, but he is also in the fortunate position of being able to advise
his client as to where a businessman might turn to raise funds.
Sources of Funds

A brief review of some of the more common sources of funds may be
helpful. Reference 3 in the bibliography (page 31) will be useful to
the reader with further interest in this topic.
In suggesting the common sources of funds, a useful method of
classification is by the length of time during which the funds will be
needed. This leads to a listing of short-term sources, intermediate-term
sources, and long-term sources.
Short-term sources are those which provide funds for one year or
less. A useful distinction in this category can be made between spon
taneous sources and negotiated sources. The former comprises normal
5

trade credit, and certainly every CPA is aware of its existence and im
portance. Such sources, once recognized, can be used advantageously
and can amount to considerable sums. The fact that these sources
usually are immediately and automatically available makes them par
ticularly appealing. Negotiated sources, on the other hand, are those
which must be sought out. The most common of these is perhaps the
local commercial bank. Other sources in this category are commercial
finance companies, accounts receivable factoring houses, special ar
rangements with trade suppliers, and advances from customers.
Through his practice over a number of years, the CPA is aware not
only of the existence of these many and different sources of funds, but
also of the types of situations in which each one is most appropriate.
The different costs involved are also part of his knowledge, and he
probably has a fairly good idea as to which sources are more anxious
to loan funds at any particular time. Through his frequent exposure
to this area, the CPA will, of course, be aware that the costs of various
forms of financing may vary from time to time, affecting their relative
attractiveness. In turn, relative costs may reflect the degree of avail
ability of different types of financing. Knowledge of these facts will
enable the CPA to tailor his advice to his client to take into account
prevailing circumstances on the business scene and his client’s indi
vidual requirements and situation. This overall knowledge which the
CPA can develop over a number of years of practice is perhaps unique
in the service he makes available to the manager of a small or medium
sized business which cannot support a full-time financial officer who
would ordinarily be familiar with this kind of information.
Intermediate-term funds are somewhat arbitrarily defined as running
between one and five to ten years. Common characteristics of these
loans are periodic repayment of principal and usually a number of
negotiated conditions which must be continually met during the life
of the loan. Historically, small businesses have found it difficult to
obtain five to ten year funds on an attractive basis; the term is too long
for many commercial banks and too short for most insurance com
panies. This gap has been filled to some extent recently by the avail
ability of funds from the Small Business Administration ( SBA) or from
Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs). Equipment manu
facturers are sometimes willing to extend credit over several years as
an inducement to buy their equipment, and equipment leasing com
panies also offer three to eight year terms at commercial financing
rates. Again, the CPA can become familiar with specific sources of
these funds and the kinds of situations to which they are appropriate.
6
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His role in helping to establish the business requirements of the loan
can also contribute much during the negotiation period.
Long-term funds are those extending for five years or more, fre
quently running for twenty years or longer. Most businesses use equity
(including retained earnings) as the primary source of permanent
capital in the company’s financial structure. Real estate mortgages
from banks or insurance companies are the most common source of
long-term debt, although unsecured bonds are also often found. Banks,
insurance companies, corporate pension funds, investment companies
and the public are potential sources of long-term funds. The CPA by
training and experience is well equipped to work closely with the com
pany and the source of funds in these situations, whether it be an
officer of a bank or a representative of an investment banking firm.
Acquisition of Funds

Being aware of these sources of funds, of course, is only one part of
the CPA’s total role in the acquisition of funds. Through his familiarity
with the financial affairs of his client’s business, the CPA is in a unique
position to help his client accomplish the important task of making a
successful appeal for funds. In fact, the CPA should be aware that the
groundwork for raising funds in most successful cases begins far in
advance of the need for funds. Sound business practice dictates that
this groundwork be laid even when there is no immediate or expected
need for funds. The CPA, for example, should encourage his client
to maintain a good day-to-day banking relationship so that, over a
period of time, a mutual confidence between the bank and the business
will develop. Such relationships, once developed and cultivated, are
invaluable, and yet are of a nature that they cannot be accomplished
in a day or over a few short weeks. By meeting his financial obliga
tions steadily and regularly, whether explicit or implicit, a businessman
can enhance his personal reputation and that of his business. By main
taining contact with a bank and keeping bank officers informed of
plans, even though there is no immediate need for funds, the company
can ensure that a sound basis is being formed on which a future and
as yet unknown need for funds may be satisfied. In brief, the CPA, as
a very interested, yet objective and professional third party, can help
the businessman with the creation of a sound business relationship
with his bank—the kind of relationship which eventually will enhance
the reputation of the business with the entire financial community.
This sort of reputation is one that can be most easily developed when
7

there is no immediate need for funds. Conversely, when the need
arises, it may be very difficult at that late date to establish either the
banking relationship or the reputation.
When there is a specific agreement between the bank and the busi
ness, the CPA can see that his client understands what he has agreed
to do, and the importance of fulfilling the conditions agreed upon.
Should the situation change ( especially adversely), he should encour
age his client to bring this to the attention of the bank in a forthright
manner. By meeting his present commitments and treating the bank
relationship with candor, the businessman can accomplish a great deal
toward assuring the acceptance of his next loan application.
The role described above, in which the CPA acts as an advisor to his
client, is a fairly common management services function performed by
many CPA firms. The client’s need for the service is easy to under
stand. The typical manager of a small or medium sized business is
attempting to discharge many different functions. Many and varied
demands are constantly made on his time. Naturally, he must postpone
those that are the least pressing on a day-to-day basis, so that he may
attend to more urgent daily matters. Financial matters are often
thought postponable, until there is a visible need for funds. All too
often the businessman tends to defer concern over financial matters
until the need for funds becomes immediate. The task of expressing
concern over these matters often falls to the man who is both familiar
with them and who is also aware of the consequences of not paying
sufficient attention to them—the CPA.
Having set this background, the CPA’s role in helping his client meet
a specific need for funds is explored. The task begins by determining
the approximate length of time the funds will be needed, and selecting
a possible source of funds for the desired term. Once the source to be
approached is decided upon by the client, the CPA can anticipate the
kinds of questions that will be raised. He can also assist the client in
preparing the sort of information that is usually requested. By review
ing this material with his client before making a visit to the source
selected, the CPA will increase the client’s chances of making a success
ful presentation.
A contrast between two businessmen who need funds serves a useful
purpose to realize how the CPA’s guidance can be of value to a client
in need of financing. One businessman walks unknown into a bank
and announces that he needs $20,000; the other, having close contact
with the bank, arrives with past financial records, a schedule indicating
8
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how the loan will be repaid, and a detailed analysis indicating why the
planned investment is a sound one for his business.
In preparing for such a visit, the CPA must first assist the client in
spelling out clearly what is probably already in the client’s mind but
no one else’s:
•
•
•
•
•

What is he planning to do?
Why?
How much money does he need?
How does he expect to repay it?
What are the risks and prospects, both optimistically and pessimistic
ally?

Along with this, the CPA can help the company analyze past finan
cial records and make future projections. He can discuss the soundness
of the proposition, and the resources and collateral of the firm which
are available to secure the loan if necessary. By making preparations
in advance, before the lender asks for information (which he surely
will), the businessman will make a better impression than in an ap
proach where the data is gathered piecemeal and in haste. Perhaps
more important, the businessman through this preplanning process will
think out more carefully what he wants to do and will in this manner
perform some of the essential planning that might otherwise be ignored.
Projecting the Requirements for Funds

The following example, describing the experience of the Fisher
Trucking Company, a small, family-owned trucking business, illus
trates some of these points. Mr. Fisher had established a good reputa
tion with his local bank through business dealings over many years.
Early in December 1966, Mr. Fisher decided that it was time to re
place three of his older trucks. He already knew what he wanted in
the way of replacements and had found that the total cost would be
$20,000. The current cash balance of the firm was $10,000, but that
would drop to about $5,000 by the end of the month. Mr. Fisher
called his CPA, Mr. Hanover, to discuss the matter. Mr. Hanover
checked his file on Fisher Trucking and noted that the cash balance
of the firm had never previously fallen below $9,000 in any year-end
statement. Mr. Fisher added that his cash balance was usually at its
lowest point at the end of the year and that he didn’t like to see it fall
much below $10,000 at any time. He felt that this was just about the
9

minimum cash balance he needed to run his business. Since there was
no doubt in Mr. Fisher’s mind about the need for these three trucks,
both men agreed that some kind of financing was in order. As a first
step, Mr. Hanover suggested that Mr. Fisher prepare some estimates
of next year’s sales revenues and expenses, and make some exploratory
contacts.
The next day, Mr. Fisher called back and told Mr. Hanover he had
called a few people, including a loan officer at his bank, and it seemed
to him that this would be the best place to raise the needed funds.
He asked Mr. Hanover what sort of questions the loan officer might
raise if a loan application were submitted to the bank. He also re
quested that Mr. Hanover prepare whatever financial analyses he
thought the bank might need. Mr. Hanover then proceeded to ask
Mr. Fisher a number of questions about sales revenues—what portion
would be cash and what portion on account, how long would it take
to collect accounts, what cash expenses would be incurred, and so on.
Since Mr. Hanover was already familiar with the firm’s financial affairs,
he was merely confirming certain expectations in some cases and ob
taining more data in others. Following this, he prepared a pro forma
income statement and a cash flow statement for 1967, as shown in
Exhibits 1 and 2, which he felt would initially meet Mr. Fisher’s
request.
Exhibit 1
FISHER TRUCKING COMPANY, INC.
Pro Forma Statement of Income
For The Year Ended December 3 1 , 1967
Revenue
Cash sales .................................................................
Sales on acco u n t.......................................................
Total revenues.......................................................
Expenses
Salaries and w a g e s...................................................
Depreciation .............................................................
Other ..........................................................................
Total expenses.......................................................
Net profit before tax es.................................................
Federal and state income tax es...................................
Net profit on operations...............................................
Anticipated d iv idend...................................................
Earnings retained in the business...............................
10

$ 45,000
245,000
$290,000
$135,000
25,000
110,000
$270,000
$ 20,000
6,000
$ 14,000
6,000
$ 8,000

1
ANALYSIS FOR PURCHASING AND FIN A N C IN G PRODUCTIVE EQUIPMENT

Exhibit 2
FISHER TRUCKING COMPANY, INC.
Projected Cash Flow Statement
For The Year Ended December 3 1 , 1967
1st
2nd
3rd
Quarter Quarter Quarter
Cash inflows
Cash revenue
$12,000 $ 8,000 $ 5,000
Receivables (calculated
below)
81,000
66,600 47,160
Total cash inflows
$93,000 $74,600 $52,160
On accounts receivable:
Balance at beginning
of quarter
$90,000 $74,000 $52,400
90% collected
81,000
66,600 47,160
$ 9,000 $ 7,400 $ 5,240
Sales for quarter
65,000 45,000
30,000
Balance, end of
quarter
$74,000 $52,400 $35,240
Cash outflows
Cash expenses:
Salaries and wages
Taxes (1966)
Other
Dividends

$35,000
6,000
30,000
$71,000

Repayment schedule
Cash inflows
Cash outflows
Net cash flow
Equipment purchase
Beginning cash balance
Cash balance, end of
quarter

4th
Quarter

Total

$ 20,000

$ 45,000

31,716
226,476
$ 51,716 $271,476

$ 35,240 $ 90,000
31,716
226,476
$ 3,524 $(136,476)
105,000 245,000
$108,524

$108,524

$135,000
6,000
110,000
6,000
$257,000

$35,000

$30,000

$ 35,000

25,000
3,000
$63,000

20,000

35,000
3,000
$ 73,000

$50,000

$93,000 $74,600
71,000
63,000
$22,000 $11,600
—
(20,000)
5,000
7,000

$52,160 $ 51,716 $271,476
50,000
73,000 257,000
$ 2,160 $ (21,284) $ 14,476
—
—
(20,000)
18,600
20,760
5,000

$ 7,000

$18,600

$20,760

$

Safety margin
International sources of
cash:
Salary
$ 1,000
Dividends

$ 1,000
1,000

$ 1,000

$

1,000
1,000

$ 4,000
2,000

(524) $

(524)

Total

$ 1,000

$ 2,000

$ 1,000

$ 2,000

$ 6,000

Cumulative

$ 1,000

$ 3,000

$ 4,000

$ 6,000

$ 6,000

The cash flow statement indicated that Fisher’s need for funds really
recurred in the first and fourth quarters, if he were to stay within the
minimum cash requirement of $10,000. For purposes of determining
the cash inflow from payments of accounts receivable, Mr. Hanover
estimated that 90 per cent of the balance outstanding at the beginning
of the quarter would be collected during that quarter, as this had been
the company’s past experience. Since this schedule indicated that
Fisher would reach a negative cash balance by the end of the fourth
quarter, Mr. Fisher suggested that if it became necessary to generate
more cash, he could reduce his own salary (which was $24,000 an
nually) by $1,000 per quarter. Furthermore, Mr. Fisher stated that
dividends could be reduced to $2,000 semiannually if necessary. Mr.
Hanover knew that the new trucks would increase the company’s de
preciation expense and thus reduce taxes, but he decided to leave out
all 1967 tax considerations at this time, since Fisher’s 1967 taxes would
not be payable until 1968. Mr. Hanover also realized that he had not
accounted for interest payments in his analysis. His feeling was that
the analysis need not be that precise at this stage.
In this example, note the following characteristics of the entire situa
tion. First, Mr. Fisher had already decided to purchase the three
trucks when he called his CPA. He knew he needed them; he knew
it was a sound investment. He turned to Mr. Hanover for advice on
raising funds. The job was actually one of justifying the loan by
demonstrating the extent of Fisher’s cash need. By gathering some
facts from Mr. Fisher and combining them with his knowledge of the
company’s and the bank’s requirements, Mr. Hanover prepared the
necessary data. Having done this, he then reviewed the entire matter
with Mr. Fisher prior to the latter’s negotiations. In his analysis, Mr.
Hanover also provided for a margin of error in case some projections
turned out to be inaccurate.
The cash flow projection will be useful not only to the lender, but
also to Mr. Fisher. Mr. Fisher can use the projection to compare actual
operating results with projected results to determine how well his cash
position and ability to meet his repayment obligations are progressing.
From all indications, Fisher’s cash problems, if any, will occur in the
fourth quarter, but they may develop much earlier in the year. The
point is, he will know the status far enough in advance to be able to
take corrective action in ample time. Thus Hanover would probably
advise Fisher to maintain regular contact with his lender and, if re
quested, could help him prepare information for the bank as the year
progresses.
12
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Of special note is the difference in the approach Mr. Fisher took
toward the loan application, as compared to one where a company
representative merely walks into a bank and asks for $20,000 to buy
three trucks, perhaps offering the assurance that the trucks can be
used as collateral if necessary. In this case, the bank knows Fisher
has planned how to repay the loan and knows that he will be aware
of trouble in advance if it should arise. The contingencies of reducing
salary and cutting dividends are also important as evidence of emer
gency cash saving ability.
Perhaps a point to bear in mind—one that is altogether obvious,
yet often overlooked—is that fiduciaries want to lend money. That’s
how they make money! A prospective borrower should make it as
easy and appealing as possible for the lender to say “yes.” The failure
to be alert to this simple point results in more rejected loan applications
than any other.
Leasing as a Source of Equipment Financing

In recent years, leasing has become an increasingly popular method
of acquiring needed equipment, particularly among smaller businesses
that may be short of funds. The distinguishing characteristic of a
lease contract is that the lessee uses the asset while the lessor retains
legal title to ownership. In return for use of the asset, the lessee
usually pays the lessor a predetermined, fixed sum at periodic intervals,
frequently monthly. For the businessman trying to decide whether to
lease his equipment or to buy it, the important point is to read the
lease contract carefully; there are important differences among leasing
plans.
Broadly speaking, there are two main types of leasing plans:
(1) those which are cancellable on relatively short notice by the
lessee (temporary rentals of automobiles or trucks are familiar ex
amples), and (2) financial leases under which the lessee agrees to
make a series of payments for a total amount sufficient to permit the
lessor to recover the entire cost of the equipment. Lease contracts of
the first type, appropriately called “rental plans,” pose no particular
analytical pitfalls; the businessman can continue to rent the equip
ment as long as it is earning a profit for him and nothing better is
available. Deciding whether to purchase a piece of equipment rather
than to lease it, as in the second category, requires the use of the
techniques for evaluating new investments, as discussed below. Rental
plans are typically more expensive than outright purchase, but they
13

offer greater flexibility at little risk to the user of the equipment and
they do require the owner to finance the item rented.
Rental plans often give the lessee the option to purchase the item
rented, with all or part of the rental payments applied to the purchase
price. Essentially this is an installment purchase with the lessee/pur
chaser having the option to cancel the purchase upon forfeiting the
payments made. Financial leases, on the other hand, usually do not
give the lessee an option to purchase, since this would qualify the
transaction as an installment sale, which would result in a tax disad
vantage to the lessor. However, financial lessors are usually interested
in disposing of leased equipment after the termination of the lease,
and the lessee would obviously have some competitive advantage in
bidding at that time, if he so wished. Financial leases usually also con
tain optional extensions at very nominal amounts. In addition, to the
distinction between rentals and financial leases, leases can also be
differentiated as “net” leases or “maintenance” leases. In a “net” lease
the lessee pays all operating and upkeep costs, while in a m ainte
nance” lease the lessor assumes this responsibility. These costs can
include insurance, taxes, maintenance, service and repair. Maintenance
leases are usually offered by manufacturers and net leases by financial
institutions, but this is not always necessarily the case; for example, a
vehicle lessor may offer maintenance leasing on a truck fleet because
his size and facilities may enable him to provide maintenance more
economically than the lessee could. Essentially the choice between a
net lease and a maintenance lease, if such a choice exists in a given
situation, will hinge on the lessee’s evaluation of the alternatives of
paying a fixed maintenance cost to the lessor or assuming the liability
himself to pay maintenance costs that can probably be expected to
vary within fairly wide extremes.
Some financial leasing plans may appear to be deceptively cheap. Al
though some equipment manufacturers do not offer financial leasing
plans on their equipment, a prospective lessee with a good credit rating
can obtain such equipment from a commercial leasing company for a
monthly payment (including a manufacturer’s service contract) that
may be 10 per cent to 20 per cent less than the amount charged by the
manufacturer on his rental plan. The difference between these two
contracts is that the cheaper one is noncancellable for many years; in
effect, the commercial lessor is really loaning money based on the
credit strength of the lessee’s promise to make the lease payments.
Viewed in this way, financial leases are simply another potential
source of funds for a businessman. Before signing a financial lease,
14
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the businessman must first be sure that he would be willing to buy the
equipment if he had the cash, because he is, in effect, buying it when
he signs a noncancellable lease. Having decided that he wants to
buy the equipment, lease financing may then be compared to alterna
tive ways of raising the same amount of money. Some of the considera
tions involved in the evaluation may be illustrated by continuing with
the Fisher Trucking Company example cited earlier.
While studying his CPA’s cash flow projections and thinking about
possible bank loan arrangements, Mr. Fisher recalled reading an adver
tisement in a trade magazine which offered to lease “all types of profit
making equipment.” A particular inducement was that this leasing
arrangement would conserve working capital; that is, Fisher would
not have to reduce his cash balance as drastically as under the plan
Mr. Hanover had developed. In fact, all he would have to do was to
make the lease payments, and he could reinvest the savings he expected
from the use of these trucks in the business. When he responded to
the advertisement, Mr. Fisher received a brochure describing the
advantages of leasing and stating that the monthly payment would be
2.25 per cent of the cost of the equipment on a five-year noncancell
able lease. A few days later a representative of the leasing company
called on Mr. Fisher and assisted in the preparation of an application
which was sent to the leasing company’s credit office. Mr. Fisher was
pleasantly surprised, a few days later, to find that the leasing company
offered him the same lease but at the rate of 2.08 per cent because of
the Fisher Company’s credit rating.
Mr. Fisher called Mr. Hanover to tell him about this and to ask his
advice.
“Well, what it boils down to,” said Mr. Hanover finally, “is this—
you sign a five-year noncancellable contract to pay this leasing com
pany $416 per month, and you’re all set. Why don’t you check back
with the bank and see what alternatives they have to offer?”
When Mr. Fisher described the lease offer to the loan office at the
bank, he found that the bank would be willing to accept a 3 per cent
add-on for a $15,000 loan to be repaid over a three-year period. This
would result in monthly payments of $454.16.
“That’s not a bad deal,” said Mr. Fisher, “but how can I compare
the $454 with the leasing company’s $416? Can’t you make the pay
ments lower?”
“Actually, our rate is quite a bit lower,” the loan officer replied, “and
that’s quite important. However, if you prefer, we’ll go along with an
$18,000 loan with a 4 per cent add-on, to be repaid over a five-year
15

period. Let’s see, that comes to $360 per month. That beats the leas
ing company’s proposal by almost $60. Frankly, though, you’re in a
good enough financial position that you don’t have to lease.”
After Mr. Fisher had related this conversation to him, Mr. Hanover
prepared the following chart:
Comparison of Financing Alternatives
Three-Year Five-Year Five-Year
Bank Loan Bank Loan
Lease
0
$ 2,000
Down payment ..................... .............. $ 5,000
$20,000
15,000
18,000
Amount borrowed ................
Repayments
4,9923
5,4501
4,3202
Year 1 ................................ ..............
4,992
5,450
4,320
Year 2 ................................ ..............
4,992
4,320
5,450
Year 3 ................................
4,992
4,320
Year 4 ................................
4,992
4,320
Year 5 ................................
7½ %
9%
6%
Implicit interest rate ............. .............
1 $454.16 per month.
2 $360.00 per month.
3 $416.00 per month.

Mr. Hanover calculated an implicit interest rate on the bank loans
simply by finding the discount rate on a set of present value tables
which would equate the repayments to the amount borrowed. For the
lease, he simply reasoned that since Fisher was going to get the use
of equipment for which he would normally have to pay $20,000, in
effect Fisher would be borrowing $20,000; he then proceeded to find
the discount rate which equated the lease payments to that figure. In
other words, having decided that obtaining the equipment was desira
ble, the only problem that remained was how to finance the purchase,
and leasing was simply a method of financing the purchase. It seemed
logical, therefore, to regard the lease payments as the same as pay
ments on a bank loan, since both involved fixed, contractual commit
ments. By finding the interest rate which was required in order for the
lease payments to amortize the purchase price, Mr. Hanover was able
to determine the implicit interest rate in the lease.1 He recognized
that under the lease the lessor would have ownership of the trucks at
1For a more thorough discussion of these calculations and some of the
problems involved in comparing various methods of financing equipment
purchases, see reference 2 in the bibliography (page 31).
16

ANALYSIS FOR PURCHASING AND FIN A N C IN G PRODUCTIVE EQUIPMENT

the end of the lease, but felt that their probable value after five years
of use was so low as to be of no consequence.
In response to Mr. Fisher’s questioning, Mr. Hanover stated that he
felt that Fisher should either attempt to negotiate temporary loan facil
ities for those periods during the year when his cash resources were
temporarily insufficient, or accept the three-year bank loan of $15,000,
requiring a $5,000 down payment by Fisher on the investment.
Hanover knew, however, that a host of other factors could be ex
tremely important in other cases involving the choice between financ
ing proposals. These factors involved, for example, the differences in
the timing of tax payments that would result from leasing and borrow
ing plans. Lease payment, for example, would be a tax deductible ex
pense; whereas, in the case of borrowing, the interest payments and
depreciation would be the related tax deductible expenses. The amount
of borrowing, too, would be different. Under a lease, more funds are
usually borrowed in the beginning, thus magnifying the differences in
tax payment timing (and also affecting the total cost of financing),
because many commercial loans run for shorter time periods than the
typical five-year financial lease. Still another difference is that under
leasing the asset always belongs to the lessor, whereas under debt
financing the asset belongs to the user of the equipment; this “loss” of
the “residual value” of leased equipment at the end of the lease is
really an extra “cost” of leasing. However, Mr. Hanover did not feel
that these elaborations were a necessary part of the analysis required
by Mr. Fisher, in view of the size of the company and the fact that
Fisher’s prime problem was one of financing.
EVALUATING INVESTM ENT ALTERNATIVES

The preceding discussion was based on the assumption that the
desirability of acquiring a piece of equipment had already been estab
lished by analysis or management judgment, subject to the ability of
the business to finance the acquisition. Frequently, however, the
desirability of an acquisition may not be clear cut, and in such circum
stances the analysis of the problem must begin at an earlier stage with
an evaluation of investment alternatives.
A careful, explicit analysis of the desirability of a proposed invest
ment may be useful for several reasons:
1. Intuitive analysis may be misleading. Perhaps the biggest ad
vantage of the “sharp pencil” approach is that it tends to force the
17

analyst to think out all of the ramifications of the investment decision,
and this process may uncover some important considerations that
might otherwise pass unnoticed until after the decision is made. There
is no guarantee that an explicit analysis will be more carefully done,
but the mere act of putting the estimate down on paper can serve to
pinpoint the critical assumptions.
2. The choice between alternative investments may be a narrow
one. A business may have sufficient cash (or available credit) to afford
to acquire new equipment, and it may be quite clear that several
attractive investment opportunities are available. The question then
becomes one of ranking the alternatives in order to decide how to in
vest the available funds, and an explicit analysis is the best practical
way to make such a comparative evaluation.
3. The decision may have to be explained or justified to other people.
This requirement is inescapable in a large organization where several
levels of management, including perhaps the board of directors, may
have to approve a proposed investment. A concise statement of the
proposal, including a calculation of the rate of return or other index
of desirability, is an efficient means of communication as well as a
useful analytical tool. Even in a smaller business, the decision-maker
may need to explain his decision to major lenders or to other stock
holders who may not be as familiar with the circumstances as he is.
For all of these reasons, the art of investment analysis has become
highly developed during the last decade. There is much literature
available on this topic, some of which is listed in the bibliography.
Without attempting to summarize all the literature in this brief space,
some of the most essential elements of investment analysis are re
viewed below, and then illustrated with reference to the Fisher Truck
ing Company.
Projections

As with most business decisions, the first and most important step in
the analysis is to estimate the effect that the proposed action will have
on the future profits and cash flows of the business. For investment
decisions, the difficulty of this task is compounded by the fact that the
effects of the investment will be felt for many years into the future.
The best way to approach such a problem is to (1) identify each ele
ment of income and expense that will be influenced by the investment,
18
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(2) estimate the change for each element, each year, for as many years
into the future as possible, and (3) calculate the change in taxable
income and tax liability. Annual (or other periodic) profit changes
can then be converted into cash flows for purpose of analysis, giving
effect to non-cash expenses like depreciation and deferrals of tax pay
ments as a result of accelerated depreciation if used for tax purposes.
The stream of after-tax flows, thus determined, may be manipulated
in a variety of ways in evaluating the absolute and relative attractive
ness of the investment proposal, as discussed below.
Absolute Indices

In order to be attractive at all, the total after-tax stream of cash in
flows from an investment must exceed the amount of initial investment
required. The “aggregate profit” on an investment (total inflows less
cost) may not be very meaningful, however, because it fails to recog
nize how much time is required for the business to recover its invest
ment and to realize the expected profit.
Investment Payback

One quick, summary measure of the attractiveness of an investment
is to calculate the time required to recover the investment. This index
is easy to grasp (“this machine will pay for itself in twenty-nine
months” ), and is commonly used as a practical tool for evaluation. Fre
quently, payback is measured on a before-tax basis; but an after-tax
calculation, while more difficult to compute, may be more meaningful.
The weakness of payback is that it does not explicitly recognize either
timing or the total expected life of the investment; two machines might
have the same payback period, but the one that has the longer life
would be the more attractive investment because the total income
from it would also be greater.
Arithmetic Rate of Return

The life of an investment is included as part of the calculation when
the arithmetic rate of return is determined. This measure relates the
income produced by the investment to the average amount invested
over the life of the asset. If an asset has no scrap value, “average in
vestment” can conveniently be calculated as one-half of the original
cost, on the basis that the excess of actual investment over one-half
19

during the first half of an asset’s life is equally matched by the excess
of one-half over the amount of the investment during the second half
of its li fe, the periodic decline in the amount of the investment being
the result of amortization in the financial sense and exhaustion or
obsolescence in the physical sense. If the asset is expected to have a
scrap value, “average investment” would be scrap value plus one-half
of that portion of cost which is to be amortized if the annual income
from the investment is uniform; the arithmetic return is simply income
divided by investment, expressed as a percentage. However, if income
is not uniform over the li fe of the investment, it too will have to be
averaged for the calculation. As a matter of policy, arithmetic return
on investment is often computed on gross cost, without allowing for
amortization. The literature on return on investment discusses this
treatment fully, if the reader requires further elucidation.
The major fault in the method just described is that no allowance is
made for the timing of cash flows. In fact, the averaging process used
may serve to distort timing, and will obscure the benefits of rapid
writeoffs for tax purposes. The additional analysis required for an
accurate time adjusted calculation of return on investment is described
below.
Discounted Return on Investment

This measure of investment attractiveness is often used rather than
payback and arithmetic return because it avoids the timing fault men
tioned above, and is not much more difficult to calculate once the
projected stream of cash flows has been prepared. The common pro
cedure is to use a set of compound interest or present value tables to
discount the value of future cash inflows. Through a sequence of trial
and error calculations (usually only three or four are required), it is
possible to find an interest rate such that the sum of the discounted
future cash flows will be equal to the amount of the investment. This
interest rate is then called the rate of return on the investment over
its life, sometimes referred to as the “internal rate of return” because
the interest rate is implicit ( or “internal” ) to the stream of cash flows,
and this rate can be found without using any other (external) data
about the company and its other investment opportunities. Use of
discounted rate of return ensures that the time value of money is
specifically recognized, and makes comparison possible between proj
ects where the only difference is in the timing of cash flows. This tech
nique is also known as the Discounted Cash Flow or DCF method.
20
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Relative Indices

The primary disadvantage of both payback and the internal rate of
return is that, although they are descriptive of the attractiveness of a
particular investment, they may be misleading if they are used to
choose between alternative investments. Stated in broad terms, the
problem of making wise investment decisions is often a problem of
selecting a combination of investments, from among a larger number
of alternatives, which will result in the highest combined return on
investment for the entire amount of capital available. This goal is not
necessarily achieved by selecting only projects with the shortest pay
back period or the highest internal rate of return. Two ways of handl
ing this problem are discussed below.
Specific alternatives. As will be illustrated below, when the alterna
tive investments are clearly specified, choosing the best project is
still not too difficult. The sequence of the analysis is to (1) estimate
the projected cash flows for each alternative, (2) compute the internal
rate of return on the investment required for each alternative, (3) com
pute the incremental investment and incremental cash inflows that are
required for the larger of any pair of alternative investments, and
(4) compute the internal rate of return on the incremental investment.
This procedure insures that the business does not miss an opportunity
to make an attractive larger investment that might have a slightly
lower internal rate of return than an alternative smaller investment.
Profitability index. As a practical matter, incremental analysis of
every possible pair of alternative investments, as described above, is
a cumbersome and inefficient procedure especially when the range of
alternatives is large. The same result can be achieved much more
easily by requesting the decision-maker to specify the minimum rate
of return which he would be willing to accept on his new investments,
and this “target rate of return” may then be used as follows as the
criterion to rank the attractiveness of alternative proposals. This ap
proach avoids the trial-and-error mechanism of computing the internal
rate on each project; instead, the “profitability index” of each project is
computed by (1) discounting the cash inflow stream at the specified
target rate, (2) deducting the investment from the sum of the dis
counted inflows to determine the discounted profit or “present value
profit” from the project, and (3) stating this profit as a ratio to the
required investment to determine the profitability index (P I). The
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best project is the one with the highest PI, and the best combination
of projects may be chosen by selecting all the highest PI projects that
can be accepted within the limits of available capital.
These analytical procedures will next be illustrated by continuing
with the Fisher Trucking Company.
Mr. Fisher’s Alternative

When Mr. Hanover had completed his lease versus buy analysis, he
called Mr. Fisher to discuss it. In the course of the discussion Mr.
Fisher raised a new question.
It turned out that one of his truck drivers had heard about the
possible purchase of the three new trucks and had approached Mr.
Fisher with the suggestion that the company buy diesel trucks rather
than gasoline engine trucks. The truck driver had emphasized the
lower cost of diesel fuel (17 cents versus 23½ cents per gallon) and
generally lower maintenance costs. Mr. Fisher knew that his regular
truck dealer also sold diesels, so he had called to check what the truck
driver had told him.
The dealer, although agreeing on lower operating costs and main
tenance, had pointed out that diesels cost more money in the first
place. He estimated that a diesel comparable to the gas truck Mr.
Fisher was considering would cost about $9,000 each, or $2,300 more
than a gas truck. He also argued that he personally sold very few die
sels because they were hard to repair and he didn’t particularly care
for them.
Mr. Fisher told Mr. Hanover that at this point he had just about
given up on diesels when his truck driver came in with a brochure
indicating that diesels would “pay for themselves in less than two
years.” Mr. Hanover said he would like to take a look at the brochure,
and Fisher agreed to meet with him for lunch the next day.
The example in the brochure compared a $10,000 gas truck with a
$12,000 diesel, both being equal in terms of carrying capacity, per
formance, and so forth. The example assumed the trucks would be
driven 60,000 miles per year. Also, the gas truck would require a
“minor” engine overhaul at 50,000 miles at a cost of $300 and a “major”
overhaul at 100,000 miles at a cost of $550. Diesel fuel cost 6 cents per
gallon less, and since both trucks were expected to average six miles
to the gallon, the diesel had a fuel saving of one cent per mile. Routine
maintenance costs (other than engine overhauls) would be about the
22
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same on either type of truck. The following summary appeared in the
brochure:
Cost of diesel truck
$12,000
Cost of gas truck .........................................................
10,000
Extra cost of d ie se l.......................................................
Savings on diesel truck
First year
Fuel ......................................................................
Overhaul
Second year
Fuel
Overhaul ...............................................................
Savings on diesel in two years ...................................
Net savings on diesel ...................................................

$2,000

$

600
300
600
550
2,050
$

50

“Well, that’s interesting,” said Mr. Hanover, “but we’ll have to get
figures for the trucks you’re interested in. Now, your dealer seems
prejudiced against diesels—maybe he’s justified and maybe he’s just
not familiar with them. Anyway, I have a client in the moving busi
ness, and I know he has some diesels in his fleet. Let me talk with him
about these figures.”
Mr. Hanover’s client had no trucks similar to the ones Mr. Fisher
would be interested in, but he did comment that in his business diesels
were preferable for some situations, while gas trucks proved better for
others. “You’ve got to take each situation separately. You can’t just
say one or the other is always better.” He then referred Mr. Hanover
to the truck dealer with whom he did business. From that dealer, Mr.
Hanover gathered the data shown in Table 1 (page 24) concerning
operating costs for gasoline and diesel trucks of the type that Mr.
Fisher was interested in.
In addition to the costs in Table 1, the dealer said that gas trucks
would require a “minor” engine overhaul after the first 40,000 miles
and then “major” overhauls every 40,000 miles thereafter. The former
would cost about $250, the latter about $450. The dealer added that
these were current costs and could easily change. He knew of no one
who would take a fixed price contract and the manufacturer offered
no guarantee on this kind of cost.
Mr. Hanover’s first approach in using these data to evaluate the two
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alternatives was to try to compute the rate of return that each type of
truck earned on its investment. The problem with this approach was in
estimating the revenue from the trucks; they were an integral part of
Mr. Fisher’s business, and Hanover wanted to avoid having to estimate
all the other costs ( drivers’ wages, etc.) which were related to truck
operations but were not affected by the type of truck used. He decided
to use an “assumed income” figure of $300 per month per truck. While
this figure was not meaningful in any real sense, it did facilitate the
comparative analysis. Using this assumption, Hanover prepared Table
2 (page 25) showing the cash flow stream over five years for a gasoline
truck.
Hanover next prepared Table 3 (page 25) in order to calculate the
gas truck’s return on investment. His first try at discounting the cash
flows was optimistic; he used a 10 per cent rate, and the future inflows
discounted at that rate were too small to recover the investment. At a
9 per cent rate, the reverse was true, and by a rough interpolation,
Hanover decided that the internal rate of return on a gas truck was
about 9.8 per cent.

Table 1
Comparative Costs for Gas and Diesel Trucks

Purchase price ..........................................................
Operating costs:
Fuel: cost per gallon ............................................
mileage per gallon.......................................
miles per year .........................................
gallons per y e a r ...........................................
cost per year ...............................................
Routine maintenance per year
State excise tax: 1styear ....................................
2nd year ...................................
3rd year ...................................
4th year
5th year ...................................
Estimated trade-in value after five years ...............
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Cost Per Truck
Gasoline Diesel
$6,700
$9,000
23½ ¢
6
30,000
5,000
$1,175
$ 250
$ 325
250
175
100
50
1,000

17¢
6
30,000
5,000
$ 850
$ 175
$ 450
350
250
150
50
1,200
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Table 2
Cash Flow Stream for a Gasoline Truck

Assumed incom e.....................
Cash costs: fuel .....................
maintenance .....
overhauls ...........
excise t a x ...........
Total cash costs .............
Net cash inflow .......................
Depreciation (S.O.D.) .........
Taxable income .....................
Federal and state income taxes
Cash inflow after taxes .........

Cash Flows at End of Year
4
5
2
3
1
3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600
1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175
250
250
250
250
250
—
—
450
250
450
50
100
250
175
325

Total
18,000
5,875
1,250
1,150
900
9,175

1,925 2,050 1,975 1,475
1,850 1,675 1,550 1,625 2,125
380
760
1,900 1,520 1,140
410
865 1,745
(50) 155
525
50
125
250
(15)
1,865 1,625 1,425 1,375 1,600
1,750

8,825
5,700
3,125
935
7,890

Table 3
Return on Investment in a
Gasoline Truck (9.8 per cent)
End
Cash
of Inflow or
Year (Outflow)
Purchase price ........
Net cash flow
after ta x e s .............

Trade-in value ......... .......
Totals ....................

0
1
2
3
4
5
5

$(6,700)
1,865
1,625
1,425
1,375
1,600
1,000
$ 2,190

10% Discount 9% Discount
Factor Amount Factor Amount
$(6,700)
$(6,700) 1.0
1.0
.909
.826
.751
.683
.621
.621

1,695
1,342
1,070
939
994
621
(39)

1,710
1,368
1,100
974
1,040
650

.917
.842
.772
.708
.650
.650
$

142
25

In similar fashion, Hanover then prepared Tables 4 and 5, and
found that the internal rate on a diesel truck was almost as good as
for a gas truck; the rate was just under 9 per cent.

Table 4
Cash Flow Stream for a Diesel Truck
Cash Flows at End of Year
2
3
4
5
$3,600 $3,600 $3,600 $3,600 $3,600
1

Assumed in co m e.........
Cash costs: fuel .........
maintenance
excise tax
Total cash cost ....
Net cash inflow ...........
Depreciation (S.O.D .)
Taxable income .........
Federal and state
income taxes .............
Cash inflow after taxes

Total
$18,000

850
175
450

850
175
350

850
175
250

850
175
150

850
175
50

4,250
875
1,250

1,475

1,375

1,275

1,175

1,075

6,375

2,125
2,600
(475)

2,225
2,080

2,325
1,560
765

2,525
520
2,005

11,625
7,800

145

2,425
1,040
1,385

(150)
2,275

50

225

425

600

1,150

2,175

2,100

2,000

1,925

10,475

3,825

Table 5
Return on Investment in a Diesel Truck (9 per cent)
End of
Year
Purchase price
0
Net cash flow
1
after taxes
2
3
4
5
Trade-in value
5

Cash Inflow
or (Outflow)
$(9,000)
2,275
2,175
2,100
2,000
1,925
1,200
$ 2,675

26

9% Discount
Factor Amount
1.0
$(9,000)
.917
.812
.772
.708
.650
.650

2,086
1,831
1,621
1,416
1,251
780
(15)

8% Discount
Factor Amount
1.0

$(9,000)

.926
.857
.794
.735
.681
.681

2,107
1,864
1,667

1,470
1,311
817
$

236
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Hanover’s analysis thus far had shown that gas trucks were slightly
superior to diesels. The analysis did not show the degree of this
superiority very closely, however, because it used a fictitious income
figure. To get around this assumption, Hanover decided to do an incre
mental analysis of the value of a diesel truck over a gas one. In Table
6 (page 28) the cash flows from Tables 2 and 4 are recapitulated,
showing that the $2,300 added investment in a diesel truck earns a
profit of $485 over five years, and this is equal to a return of about
6.5 per cent.
One of the advantages of an incremental analysis such as the one
shown in Table 6 is that it permits a more explicit description of the
alternatives. Mr. Fisher has already decided to buy some type of truck
because he needs them to carry on his profitable business. Very little
analysis may be necessary before making that decision, and the internal
rate of return on that investment need not even be computed. On the
other hand, however, buying a diesel truck instead of gas is a quite
separate investment that will earn 6.5 per cent. The important thing
to recognize is that the diesel investment decision is an incremental
cost of $2,300, not the $9,000 selling price.
The desirability of the diesel investment will depend upon Mr.
Fisher’s evaluation of the adequacy of the 6.5 per cent rate of return,
considering (1) the risks involved in the investment (i.e., in the choice
between gas and diesel), (2) the availability of funds for the invest
ment, and (3) the attractiveness of alternative opportunities to invest
the available funds. In this case, three diesels will cost about as much
as four gas trucks, and Mr. Fisher might want to evaluate that pair of
alternatives also. A direct comparison would be difficult, however, not
only because of the much more complicated estimates of revenue and
expense from operating one more truck, but also because the invest
ment in a fourth truck ( an increase in capacity by one-third) is much
riskier than the investment to upgrade three gas trucks to diesels (no
capacity change). If Mr. Fisher found that a careful estimate of all
revenues and expenses indicated that a fourth gas truck might earn a
10 per cent return on its investment, he might still decide to put the
money into three diesels at a 6.5 per cent return because of the lower
risk in the latter investment.
While it is almost impossible to quantify the risk element in invest
ment decisions,1 one practical way to make a step in that direction is to
1 See reference 4 in the bibliography (page 31) for an interesting approach
to this subject.
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28

Diesel

$(9,000)
2,275
2,175
2,100
2,000
3,125

$ 2,675

End of
Year

0
1
2
3
4
5

Totals

$ 2,190

$(6,700)
1,865
1,625
1,425
1,375
2,600

Gasoline

$

485

$(2,300)
410
550
675
625
525

Difference

________ Cash Inflows or ( Outflows)________
1.0
.935
.873
.816
.763
.713
$

(35)

$(2,300)
383
480
551
477
374

7% Discount
Factor
Amount

Return on Incremental Investment of
Diesel Over Gasoline Truck (6.5 per cent)

1.0
.943
.890
.840
.792
.747

$___ 31

$(2,300)
387
490
567
495
392

6% Discount
Factor
Amount

Table 6
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adjust the “target rate of return” to reflect the decision-maker’s re
quirements for different types of investments. This approach both (1)
simplifies the calculations by eliminating a trial-and-error search for
the internal rate, and (2) permits a direct comparison of the profit
ability of alternative classes of investments. For example, if Mr. Fisher
had stated that he was willing to invest in diesels if they would earn
at least 6 per cent after taxes on the incremental investment, then the
analysis might have proceeded as shown in Table 7 (below) and Table
8 (page 30).
In these calculations, no fictitious revenue figures are required in
order to compute the after-tax, discounted cost of owning either type
of truck for a period of five years. Using the 6 per cent discount rate,
a gas truck costs $9,881, or slightly more than the $9,850 cost of a

Table 7
Present Value Cost of Owning a
Gasoline Truck for Five Years,
Discounted at 6 per cent
Cash Flows at End of Year
2
3
5
1
4
Total
1. Cash operating costs $1,750 $1,925 $2,050 $1,975 $1,475 $ 9,175
2. Depreciation (SOD) 1,900
1,520
1,140
760
380
5,700
3. Deductible expenses
1,855
14,875
(1+ 2 ) ................. 3,650 3,445 3,190 2,735
4. Federal and state in
1,030
955
come taxes (shield) 1,095
830
555
4,465
1,095
5. Net cash cost (1-4) ..
655
895
1,145
920
4,710
6. Less trade-in value..
1,000
1,000
7. Net cash outflows
1,095
(inflows) ...............
655
895
1,145
3,710
(80)
8. 6% discount factor..
.943
.890
.840
.792
.747
9. Present value of
920
future costs...........
618
797
906
(60) $3,181
10. Investment required
to start .................
6,700
11. Total ownership cost

$9,881
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diesel. The advantage of this type of calculation is that each alterna
tive is treated separately, yet comparisons between any two or more
alternatives may be made directly without further calculation. Table
6 (page 28) showed earlier that a direct comparison of these two
trucks discounted at 6 per cent yielded a $31 advantage to the diesel
truck, and this is the same difference shown between the totals on
Tables 7 and 8. Similar comparisons between other alternative invest
ments could also be made in this fashion.

Table 8
Present Value Cost of Owning a
Diesel Truck for Five Years,
Discounted at 6 per cent

1

Cash Flows at End of Year
2
3
4

1. Cash operating costs $1,475 $1,375 $1,275
1,560
2. Depreciation ........... 2,600 2,080
3. Deductible expenses
(1 + 2 ) ................. 4,075 3,455 2,835
4. Federal and state in
1,030
855
come taxes (shield) 1,230
345
245
420
5. Net cash cost (1-4)....
6. Less trade-in value ..
7. Net cash outflows
245
345
420
(inflows) ...............
.840
.943
.890
8. 6% discount factor ..
9. Present value of
future costs...........
10. Investment required
to start .................
11. Total ownership cost
30

231

307

353

5

Total

$1,075
520

$ 6,375

1,040
2,215

1,595

14,175

655
520

480
595

4,250
2,125

1,200

1,200

520
.792

(605)
.747

925

411

(452) $

850

$1,175

7,800

9,000
$ 9,850
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LIST OF CASES

The remainder of this bulletin consists of four case studies. The
cases are arranged roughly in order of increasing complexity in terms
of the amount of analysis required by the reader using the cases for
staff training purposes.
1. Egyptian Express Lines, Inc. Using cash flow analysis to examine
the feasibility and desirability of acquiring a new fleet of trucks.
2. Acton Machine Company. Evaluating the replacement of two old
lathes with one new one.
3. Slatka Tool and Mold Corporation. Projecting cash flows and al
ternative financing arrangements to permit the acquisition of a
major new piece of equipment.
4. Worcester Bowl, Inc. A combination acquisition and financing de
cision involving the purchase of automatic pinsetting equipment
that is currently being leased.
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Egyptian Express Lines, Inc.
On the morning of January 15, 1964, Mr. Snyder Hendricks reviewed
the audit report and work papers prepared by one of his staff men for
Egyptian Express Lines, Inc. for 1963. Hendricks was the senior part
ner of Hendricks, Rogers and Hendricks, a St. Louis CPA firm, and
was a personal friend of Mr. Walter Willhite, chairman of the board
and chief executive officer of Egyptian Express. Egyptian Express had
been an audit and, occasionally, a management services client of the
firm for ten years. Willhite’s decision in 1953 to hire a CPA firm had
been based on his bank’s insistence at the time on submission of audited
financial statements in connection with a loan then being negotiated,
and on his own personal intention of having a public offering of stock
some time in the future, for which he knew audited financial state
ments would be required. (A local offering was successfully under
taken in 1959.) Willhite had soon discovered that Hendricks, Rogers
and Hendricks was capable of serving him in many more ways than
annual audits, and he had consequently drawn on them from time-totime for assistance with managerial problems. Some of these had ini
tially been brought to his attention by Snyder Hendricks when the
latter discussed each year’s audit report with him.
Hendricks’ review of the 1963 audit report, plus his knowledge of
Willhite’s current plans, had made him aware that Egyptian Express
was in a tenuous financial position. He felt obligated to point out to
Willhite that Egyptian Express’ cash flow situation was likely to be
come a serious problem within the next year. He also felt that the
situation was one where he could be of some service to his client, at
least in terms of suggesting alternative solutions to the problem.
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Egyptian Express Lines, Inc. was a small trucking company serving
eastern Missouri, southern Illinois and parts of Kentucky. Head
quarters were in Cairo, Illinois. The company had been formed by
Mr. Willhite and two associates in 1950 and had grown continuously.
Starting with a handful of leased trucks, the company had acquired
forty-eight pickup and delivery trucks, eighty-four tractors and 131
trailers by the end of 1963. As shown in the company’s balance sheet
as of December 31, 1963 (Exhibit 1, page 35), this equipment had a
book value of $921,000. In addition, an associated company had re
cently constructed three warehouse terminal facilities in Paducah,
Kentucky, and Cairo and Mount Vernon, Illinois, to facilitate the stor
age and interchange of freight. These asset additions reflected man
agement’s philosophy regarding growth. As Mr. Willhite had phrased
it on many occasions, “You can’t stand still in the trucking business;
you either move ahead or you get swallowed up by the big fellow.”
Revenues had grown over the years to the level of $3.3 million in 1963.
(The company’s income statements for 1963 and 1962 are shown in
Exhibit 2, page 36.)
Egyptian Express enjoyed a reputation among its customers for
careful handling of freight and expeditious delivery. The company
had aggressively sought new customers and was eager to expand into
new territories.
Egyptian Express’ chief executive officer, Mr. Willhite, had been in
the trucking business for many years. Although Mr. Willhite’s man
agement functions extended to all aspects of Egyptian Express’ activi
ties, he concentrated his attention primarily on “the equipment” which
he considered to be “the guts” of the business. This category of de
cisions involved the determination of the type, quantity and timing of
equipment purchases, equipment disposal, equipment maintenance,
insurance, and the related plans for financing particular equipment
decisions.
The president of the company, Ralph Sanders, was in charge of
traffic and sales, the other principal operating function of the business.
A third manager, Ted Marmor, was listed as the company’s treasurer,
but he was engaged in a number of other ventures and usually did
not become involved in Egyptian Express’ management decisions.
Until 1959 each of these three executives had owned one-third of
Egyptian Express’ outstanding common stock. In that year additional
stock amounting to 25 per cent of the previous total was sold to local
investors.
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Exhibit 1
EGYPTIAN EXPRESS LINES, INC.
Balance Sheet, December 31, 1963
ASSETS
Current Assets
Cash ...............................................................................
Notes receivable ........................................................
Accounts receivable (net) ........................................
Prepaid expenses ........................................................

$

28,371
60,013
321,928
110,889

$ 521,201
Total current assets
Fixed Assets
Cost .............................................................................. $1,666,181
745,615
920,566
Accumulated depreciation ....................................
Total Assets ........................................................ .................. $1,441,767

LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH
Liabilities
Current:
Notes payable ............................................................................ $ 257,985
Accounts payable ......................................................................
291,514
Taxes payable ............................................................................
54,054
Accrued expenses ......................................................................
58,933
Total current liabilities ........................................................ $ 662,486
Long-term:
Notes payable ............................................................................

578,219

Total Liabilities ...................................................................... $1,240,705
Net Worth
Capital stock:
Common
Authorized 1,000,000 shares $1 par
Issued 184,295 shares .......................................... $185,295
Preferred
Authorized 1500 shares par $100
Issued 110 shares ..................................................
11,000
Capital Surplus ..................................................................
7,760
Retained earnings ............................................................
34,247
$237,302
Treasury stock at cost:
Common-36,240 shares .............................................

36,240

201,062

Total Liabilities and Net W o rth .......................................... $1,441,767
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Exhibit 2
EGYPTIAN EXPRESS LINES, INC.
Comparative Statements of
Income and Retained Earnings
For the Years Ended December 31, 1962 and 1963

(Cents omitted)

1963

1962

Net freight revenue .............................................. $3,313,532

$3,102,450

Operating expenses:
Equipment maintenance and garage ........... $ 384,880
Transportation ................................................... 1,137,917
585,305
T erm inal..............................................................
154,193
Traffic ..................................................................
Insurance and safety ........................................
169,047
342,999
Administrative and g e n e ra l...............................
196,894
Taxes and licenses .............................................
Total operating expenses........................... $2,971,235

$ 376,552
1,107,130
512,282
137,944
170,019
300,608
162,406
$2,766,941

Gross margin ........................................................ $ 342,297
255,760
Provision for depreciation....................................
Income from operations ...................................... $ 86,537

$ 335,509
245,954
$ 89,555

Other income:
Interest received .............................................. $
Extraordinary income ......................................
Gain on disposal of equipment.....................
Total other income .................................. $
Sub-total ................................................ $
Other charges:
Interest paid ...................................................... $
Extraordinary charges ......................................
Provisions for bad debts ...................................
Donations ..........................................................
Total other charges ................................... $
Income before taxes ............................................ $
Federal income tax provision ..............................

6,621
189
1,371

$

8,181
94,718

$
$

54,695
2,879
9,465
675
67,714
27,004
7,087
Net income ............................................................ $ 19,917
128,933
Retained earnings, January 1 ..............................
(14,363)
Prior years’ tax adjustments ...............................
(240)
Dividends paid .....................................................
Retained earnings, December 31 ..................... $ 134,247
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1,253
(5,813)
(4,560)
84,995

44,053
6,539
4,422
950
$ 55,964
$ 29,031
8,414
$ 20,617
109,076
$

(760)
$ 128,933
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Hendricks, Rogers and Hendricks

Hendricks, Rogers and Hendricks was a highly regarded St. Louis
firm of certified public accountants. The firm consisted of six partners,
including Snyder Hendricks and his son, Seymour Hendricks, and
forty-eight staffmen. Snyder Hendricks and Mr. Joseph Rogers had
founded the firm in 1942. Mr. Rogers had been active in the firm until
his death in 1959.
Most of the firm’s clients were small to medium sized businesses, and
several had grown to sufficient size to offer their stock to the public,
like Egyptian Express. Hendricks, Rogers and Hendricks had assisted
these clients with their public offerings as well as with subsequent
transitions in management practices and reporting necessitated by
the existence of outside stockholders.
A number of the firm’s clients relied on the partners who handled
these accounts to advise them on management problems. As a general
rule the firm had performed periodic audit and accounting services for
these clients for some time prior to being asked to perform manage
ment services. As the clients gained confidence in the firm’s ability in
this area and gradually became aware of its broader advisory capabil
ities, they began to request more and more “management services”
assistance.
Hendricks, Rogers and Hendricks had not made a practice of billing
clients for these consultations on a per diem basis. Rather, the annual
retainer in most cases was established in recognition of the fact that
management services would be made available whenever they were
required; the fee was adjusted annually to reflect the amount of time
spent on management services activities for the client. A particularly
large project, however, such as preparation for a public offering, would
be handled as a separate engagement.
Mr. Hendricks had supervised the Egyptian Express account until
1959. Tom Gray, one of the firm’s experienced staff men, did much of
the work for this client under Mr. Hendricks’ direction; both had
established fine rapport with the company over the years.
When a more difficult problem arose, Gray quickly called it to the
attention of Mr. Hendricks. Additionally, Mr. Willhite would on occa
sion call Mr. Hendricks directly to arrange for a discussion or to ask
for advice. On still other occasions, such as the present instance, Mr.
Hendricks would offer management advice on his own initiative when
he had a meeting planned with Mr. Willhite.
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Acquisition of Facilities

In 1956 Mr. Willhite decided that it would be advantageous for
Egyptian Express to acquire its own fleet of trucks, trailers and tractors
and to discontinue its previous practice of leasing equipment. This de
cision was made without consulting Hendricks, Rogers and Hendricks.
Accordingly, Egyptian Express began to buy equipment piece by piece.
By 1958 an entire fleet had been acquired largely from equipment
manufacturers who financed the sales via their own captive finance
companies. Equipment notes were signed bearing simple interest
rates from 5 per cent to 7 per cent, with maturities ranging from twen
ty-four to sixty months. These individual notes were secured by chattel
mortages on the equipment which the manufacturers sold to Egyptian
Express.
During 1959 the fleet was further expanded with the proceeds of
the stock offering and additional debt financing. At the same time
management decided to build a terminal in Paducah. Mr. Hendricks
was asked to perform an economic analysis related to this decision. His
findings suggested that it would be just as advisable to rent facilities
as to own them, at least for the time being, and that Egyptian Express’
cash flow might not be sufficient to digest a project of this magnitude.
After considering all factors involved, Egyptian Express’ management
decided to establish a new corporation, in which they would be part
owners, to build the terminal.
Early in 1961 Egyptian Express began to miss monthly note amorti
zation payments on certain of its equipment obligations. In June 1961,
Yellow Motor Company, one of Egyptian Express’ equipment sup
pliers, consolidated twelve separate note agreements into one package
agreement which in effect reduced the required monthly installment
and deferred ultimate repayment.
New equipment costing $150,000 was added in 1962, and again the
financing was provided by the equipment manufacturers on a sixtymonth basis. Two new terminals were also constructed in Cairo and
Mount Vernon. One of these terminals was financed by a second com
mon stock offering. Hendricks, Rogers and Hendricks had com
mented favorably on this financial plan. The second terminal was
financed by a $60,000 loan from one of the major oil companies. The
loan was secured by the land and proposed terminal building, under
an agreement which, among other things, obligated the carrier to buy
the oil company’s gasoline and oil exclusively and to repay the loan on
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a “one cent per gallon of gas purchased” basis. The cost of the loan
amounted to 5 per cent, simple interest.
By the end of 1963 Egyptian Express was experiencing difficulty in
meeting many of its equipment obligations. As one of Egyptian Ex
press’ bookkeepers put it to Mr. Gray, “It’s now necessary around here
to rob Peter to pay Paul. We have to do an awful lot of juggling to
keep our heads above water.”
It was in this context that Mr. Snyder Hendricks called in Tom Gray
on January 15, 1964 to discuss the Egyptian Express situation prior to
the former’s meeting with the client planned for the 17th. Relevant
excerpts from this discussion are reproduced below.
Hendricks: Tom, I’ve been reviewing the Egyptian Express figures
and the cash situation appears pretty bleak. I am aware
of the fact that over the years many companies in the
trucking industry have been grossly undercapitalized. Just
the other day I read a speech given by a CPA in New
York which commented that the percentage of capital to
total liabilities and capital for all firms in the industry
averaged less than 40 per cent last year. This is a far cry
from the 50 per cent or more usually considered adequate
by financial analysts and lenders. Yet in Egyptian Ex
press’ case, the financial condition is far worse than even
these average figures, about 15 per cent. I have my
doubts as to whether their cash position is strong enough
to sustain them through the next year. Are there any signs
of improvement?
Gray:

Well, the month of December showed a $54,000 loss. Ad
mittedly, December is normally a slow month and this
year there were a number of shutdowns during the storms.
But, unless Egyptian Express can generate some profits
during the next few months, I think they will find them
selves in a very tight squeeze.

Hendricks: How aware of the situation is Wally Willhite?
Gray:

You know Mr. Willhite better than I. If there ever was an
optimist, he’s one! He predicts that Egyptian Express will
have a fabulous year in 1964 as the economy keeps rolling
along. They are talking revenues of $4 million for 1964
and after-tax profits of $150,000. Their profit projections
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are broken down roughly as follows: they expect to break
Gray
(continued) even in January, net $6,000 in February, and earn roughly
$15,000 per month from March through September. Octo
ber and November are their best months and they project
$20,000 for each. This puts them over $150,000; if Decem
ber is no worse than breakeven, the estimate is safe.
Hendricks: Do you think this is completely out of line, Tom?
Gray:

I guess it’s not impossible. If the economy holds up, the
trucking business should be really good. A more crucial
question is, “W hat needs to be done by all concerned to
turn this estimate into reality?” An after-tax estimate of
$150,000 for 1964 represents a major improvement over
1963 and 1962. This in turn is partly because they expect
business to be good, and much of the capacity added in
recent years is now shaken down and achieving optimum
utilization. With the expected volume increase the gross
margin percentage on additional sales will be much higher
than the overall gross margin percentage typically realized
on the existing sales level. And the additional sales show
signs of being quite dramatically high, because of both
the state of the economy and the fact that the company’s
re-equipment program has widened its markets. Of course,
if we do ever have to do any further analysis or forecasting
I suggest we first explore their $150,000 profit forecast in
some detail and see how realistic that is.
I know that Mr. Willhite and Mr. Sanders have spent
quite some time figuring out the 1964 forecast; it’s not
guesswork, and is based on assumptions that presumably
can be justified. However, I’m not ready to take those
estimates at face value just yet. As I said, if we do any
work connected with a 1964 projection of any sort, we
probably ought to take a long hard look at the premises
on w hich the forecast is based before we m ake any judge

ments about anything.
There’s one thing, however, that could upset the apple
cart.
Hendricks: What is that?
Gray:
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Mr. Willhite intends to buy another thirty tractors to re
place the equipment they bought back in 1956 and 1957
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and to enlarge the fleet. A number of the old tractors are
in terrible condition and the maintenance costs have al
ready begun to soar. The new tractors are essential if
Egyptian Express is to carry a $4 million payload. The
tentative plan is to buy five tractors a month starting in
March. They could probably be persuaded to wait until
June, however, if really necessary.
Hendricks: W hat will the tractors cost?
Gray:

I estimate that Mr. Willhite intends to spend $400,000 on
equipment this year. The tractors alone cost $10,000 each.
The disposal value of the equipment to be traded in is
approximately $150,000 according to their calculations.

Hendricks: Do they have any other plans up their sleeves?
Gray:

Not to my knowledge. I think they are beginning to place
a premium on survival after last year’s experiences. I do
know that Mr. Willhite wants to retire the $11,000 of pre
ferred stock during 1964. My guess is that total extra
ordinary capital expenditures for the preferred stock and
for items other than equipment will not exceed $40,000
this year.

Hendricks: W hat are the loan amortization requirements?
Gray:

Here is a schedule of outstanding obligations as of the
date of audit, December 31, 1963 ( see Exhibit 3, page 42).
Note amortization doesn’t vary much from month to
month; the average is about $20,000 to $22,000. I also
have a schedule of depreciation projections (see Exhibit
4, page 43). In the depreciation projections I have in
cluded the thirty tractors to be acquired in 1964. In the
list of outstanding obligations, however, I omitted the
financing for the new tractors since I couldn’t conceive
of how they could possibly be financed.

Hendricks: Well, Tom, that seems to be the big question. Given
the difficulty Egyptian Express has experienced in meet
ing amortization payments during the last year, I suspect
the equipment manufacturers will be quite reluctant to
underwrite the new requirement. I remember a similar
situation in which Gateway Truck was able to obtain a
loan from the County Bank. (Hendricks, Rogers and
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Hendricks Hendricks served as auditors for Gateway Trucking Com
(continued) pany, a regional firm approximately four times as large as
Egyptian Express.) Of course, this was in the days
before manufacturers financed their own equipment sales
to any large extent. Nevertheless, I believe that one
of the local banks might be willing to extend Egyptian
Express a line of credit if the forecast profits do
materialize. The interest rate would undoubtedly be high
and it’s extremely unlikely that the maximum line would
exceed $100,000. At this point, Tom, I am not sure
whether cash flows during 1964 will be sufficient to

Exhibit 3
EGYPTIAN EXPRESS LINES, INC.
Schedule of Notes Payable, December 31, 1963

Total
Due to:
Equipment
Yellow Motor Company ............ ............ $165,750
Evans Mfg. C om pany.................. ............ 151,034
County National Bank ................ ............ 207,421
11,973
Springs Trust Company .............. ............
33,088
Paducah Trust Company ............ ............
77,101
Acme Incorporated ...................... ............
9,961
Nassau Trust Company .............. ............
630
Mount Vernon Trust Co.............. ............
2,153
Carbondale State B a n k ................ ............
$659,111

Due
Within
One Year

Due
After
One Year

$ 52,884
48,341
48,621
9,897
14,172
33,415
8,295
630
2,153
$218,408

$112,866
102,693
158,800
2,076
18,916
43,686
1,666
—
—
$440,703

Other
Estate of Phillip W ilso n .............. ............ $ 16,003
66,013
National Oil Company ................ ............
50,000
County Trust Company .............. ............
25,000
Cities National Bank .................. ............
12,500
Franklin Distributors Co.............. ............
2,500
Harry T olstock.............................. ............
5,077
Motorama ...................................... ............
$177,093

$ 8,500
6,000
10,000
5,000
2,500
2,500
5,077
$ 39,577

$ 7,503
60,013
40,000
20,000
10,000

$137,516

$836,204

$257,985

$578,219
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Total

T ru ck s ............................................
Trailers
Tractors ........................................
Service cars
Service cars-salesmen ...................

$297,277

$ 25,688
104,855
153,071
7,747
5,916

Tax return depreciation:
(also used in financial statements) 1964

$248,070

$ 10,750
96,360
132,549
5,995
2,416

1965

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

$176,387 $107,545 $64,969 $19,377 $10,249 $2,146

$ 4,707 $
45
—
91,876
61,649 $38,473 $18,638 $10,249 $2,146
77,876
45,430 26,496
739
—
1,324
421
—
604
—

1966

EGYPTIAN EXPRESS LINES, INC.
Summary of Projected Depreciation
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Hendricks meet amortization requirements even with an additional
(continued) $100,000 loan. I do know that the personal circumstances
of the principals at this point rule out the possibility of
any additional equity contributions on their part in the
near future. Furthermore, even if Wally were willing
to sell more stock to the public, which he isn’t, he’d have
a hard time moving it, considering their profit record for
the past few years. In light of these conditions, I’m not
sure how to advise Mr. Willhite. We have a professional
responsibility to call this situation to his attention but
just how far to go is something I haven’t decided. I’ll
postpone this decision until I have a chance to look at
these figures again in light of your comments and have
determined just how serious the situation really is.
Questions

1. Using the information in the case, analyze the urgency of
Egyptian Express’ financial needs. Are anticipated cash flows suf
ficient to enable the company to acquire the needed tractors? What
effect would the proposed $100,000 bank line have on the sufficiency
of inflows?
2. W hat are the most critical sources of uncertainty upon which
Egyptian Express’ cash flows depend?
3. What, if anything, could you do to tie down the cash flow pro
jections—in other words, to increase your confidence in the likelihood
of the anticipated cash flow outcome?
4. What advice would you give Mr. Willhite? Should Hendricks
have discussed the matter with him in general terms first, before
analyzing the situation in depth?

COMMENTARY ON EGYPTIAN EXPRESS LINES, INC.
Snyder Hendricks, Sr.’s Analysis

On the morning of January 15, 1964, Mr. Snyder Hendricks was
briefed by Mr. Tom Gray, a staff man for the certified public account
ing firm, Hendricks, Rogers and Hendricks, regarding the financial
condition of one of the firm’s clients, Egyptian Express Lines, Inc.
Mr. Hendricks had arranged to meet with Mr. Walter Willhite, the
44

EGYPTIAN EXPRESS LINES, INC.

chief executive officer of Egyptian Express two days later to discuss
the 1963 audit, but he also planned to talk about the financial prob
lems which Egyptian Express faced. Mr. Gray, who handled the
Egyptian Express account, was particularly well versed on the Egyp
tian Express situation, having just returned from a two-week, closingaudit field trip at the company’s home office.
After the discussion with Gray (recounted earlier) Mr. Hendricks
began his analysis. As a starting point he constructed a sources and
applications of funds statement for Egyptian Express for the current
year, 1964. This step enabled Hendricks to assess quickly the impli
cation of Gray’s observations on the probable cash position of Egyp
tian Express at the end of the year.
This work sheet, which is reproduced as Exhibit 5 (below), was
based on Gray’s indication of what Egyptian Express’ management
Exhibit 5
EGYPTIAN EXPRESS LINES, INC.
Statement of Anticipated Sources and Uses of Funds
For the Year Ending December 31, 1964

Sources of funds:
Net profits from operations
(management estimate) ...............................
Add back depreciation ....................................

$151,000
297,277

Funds provided by operations
New bank loan (probable maximum)
Proceeds from disposal of old equipment
Total funds available
Uses of funds:
Acquisition of fixed assets
Tractors
Other equipment ..............................................................
Other expenditures, including retirement
of preferred stock

$448,277
100,000
150,000
$698,277

$300,000
100,000
40,000

Amortization of long-term debt and retirement
of installment contracts outstanding ..............................

257,985

Total funds a p p lie d .......................................................

$697,985

Net increase in working capital

$292
45

intended to spend in 1964, Egyptian Express’ estimate of 1964 earn
ings, and Hendricks’ own hunch that the company could secure a
$100,000 line of credit from a local bank. At this stage Hendricks
did not make any assumption regarding the average collection period
on receivables, even though the amount of funds generated from
operations depended importantly on how long it took to convert
accounts receivable into cash. To start with, he assumed that ac
counts receivable and all other working capital items would remain
unchanged from December 31, 1963 to December 31, 1964, so that
1964 net cash revenues would be equivalent to the profits forecast
for the period.
During his analysis of the projected uses and disposition of funds
statement, Hendricks concluded that a number of variables would
be crucial to the funds flow outcome. For instance, the statement
revealed that an increase in the company’s cash position (net work
ing capital) would be likely only if the assumed revenue and profit
estimates materialized. Mr. Hendricks had for the moment accepted
the company’s internal 1964 forecast, but, as already stated, he felt
he would like to review the forecast before using it in an any more
sophisticated analysis. A related assumption which Mr. Hendricks
regarded as extremely important was the notion that accounts receiv
able would be converted into cash at a pace permitting Egyptian
Express to realize cash during the year in an amount equivalent to
profits (i.e., that year-end receivables and other working capital items
would be the same in 1964 as in 1963). Additionally, Hendricks made
special note of the implicit assumption that Egyptian Express would
be able to achieve the anticipated level of sales activity without
increasing working capital.
Mr. Hendricks earmarked each of these assumptions as critical
elements of uncertainty upon which the cash flow outcome would
depend in large measure. In addition, these assumptions were largely
unrealistic because of the absence of concrete action or plans to bring
them about. For this reason he intended to check out the assumptions
with Mr. Willhite to obtain whatever additional information and in
sight into these variables the latter could provide.
Hendricks tentatively concluded from this cursory analysis that
Egyptian Express could weather the financial crisis from balance sheet
date to balance sheet date if the above mentioned assumptions were
realistic, if circumstances were made conducive to their realization,
and if the $100,000 of additional outside financing could in fact be
obtained. Next, Hendricks decided to perform a rough analysis of
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the timing of Egyptian Express cash flows during the forthcoming
year. He regarded this step as essential for the following two reasons:
first, the uses and disposition of funds statement suggested that there
would be only a nominal increase in net working capital at year’s end
if the projections materialized; therefore, even under optimal circum
stances there would be little margin for error. Secondly, large expendi
tures for the new equipment might occur well in advance of substantial
inflows from operations and borrowing, thereby creating a sizeable
cash flow deficit at some point during the year.
By analyzing the implication of the timing of anticipated inflows
and outflows on company liquidity prior to meeting with the client,
Hendricks would be able to assess the feasibility of alternative timing
arrangements for acquiring the new tractors during 1964. Hendricks
concluded that he could be of greatest service to his client by pro
viding insight into the consequences of making discretionary expendi
tures at various times during the year, for he believed that Mr.
Willhite might not have considered this possibility.
To summarize the timing of anticipated inflows and outflows and
their interrelated effect on company liquidity, Hendricks prepared a
schedule of monthly inflow-outflow summaries on the basis of Gray’s
remarks. These summaries were subsequently related to the cash
balance shown in the December 31 closing audit to ascertain Egyp
tian Express’ probable net cash position at the end of each month.
These summaries and the net cash positions are shown as the cash
budget in Exhibit 6 (pages 48-49).1 To prepare the cash budget, Hen
dricks made several simplifying assumptions which were necessary as
a first step.
First, as in the source and disposition of funds projection he had
prepared, he presumed that accounts receivable and other working
capital items would not change from month end to month end. He
recognized that this was a poor and probably fallacious assumption,
but the purpose of this exercise was simply to spread by months the
information already extracted for the sources and disposition of funds
statement (Exhibit 5). Hendricks felt that there was no need for any
further elaboration or accuracy in the data at this stage, recognizing
that if the 1964 profit forecast were ever reviewed by him or his men,
all subsequent analyses would have to be done over. Since at this
time his main concern was to see how things would look if a whole

1 Some approximations used, but based on Exhibit 5 (page 45).
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Preliminary Cash Budget, 1964
INFLOWS

Jan.

Feb.

March

April

May

June

1. Net operating
receipts .......

000

$ 6,000

$15,000

$15,000

$15,000

$15,000

2. Receipts from
disposal of
tractors (6
monthly
installments) .

000

000

000

000

000

25,000

3. Depreciation.

$24,750

24,750

24,750

24,750

24,750

24,750

4. Total inflows.

$24,750

$30,750

$39,750

$39,750

$39,750

$64,750

OUTFLOWS
5. Tractor
purchases.....

000

000

000

000

000

$50,000

6. Other
equipment
purchases1 ....

$ 8,333

$ 8,333

$ 8,333 $ 8,333

$ 8,333

8,333

7. Other items1..

3,333

3,333

3,333

3,333

3,333

3,333

8. Amortization
of notes out
standing1 .....

21,500

21,500

21,500

21,500

21,500

21,500

9. Total
outflows .......

$33,166

$33,166

$33,166

$33,166

$33,166

$83,166

10. Net inflows
(outflows).... ($ 8,416) ($ 2,416) $ 6,584

$ 6,584

$ 6,584 ($18,416)

11. Drawing on
$100,000 bank
lo a n ...............

000

12. Net inflow
after drawing
on bank loan
of $100,000 .. ($ 8,416) ($ 2,416) $ 6,584

$ 6,584

$ 6,584 ($ 8,416)

13. Net cash posi
tion, 12/31/63
cash balance
$28,371 .........

$30,707

$37,291

$19,955

000

$17,539

$24,123

000

10,000

000

000

1 Assumes that outflows occur in equal monthly installments.
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Exhibit 6

Dec.

Totals

July

Aug.

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

$15,000

$15,000

$15,000

$20,000

$20,000

000

$151,000

25,000

25,000

25,000

25,000

25,000

000

150,000

24,750

24,750

24,750

24,750

24,750

$24,750

297,000

$64,750

$64,750

$64,750

$69,750

$69,750

$24,750

$598,000

$50,000

$50,000

$50,000

$50,000

$50,000

000

$300,000

8,333

8,333

8,333

8,333

8,333

$ 8,333

99,996

3,333

3,333

3,333

3,333

3,333

3,333

39,996

21,500

21,500

21,500

21,500

21,500

21,500

258,000

$83,166

$83,166

$83,166

$83,166

$83,166

$33,166

$697,992

($18,416) ($18,416) ($18,416) ($13,416) ($13,416) ($ 8,416) ($ 99,992)

18,416

$

000

$28,875

18,416

$

000

$28,875

18,416

$

000

$28,875

13,416

$

000

$28,875

13,416

$

000

$28,875

7,920

($

496)

100,000

$

8

$28,379
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list of (probably optimistic) assumptions were realized, not to make a
formal projection reflecting his professional standards of competence,
Hendricks decided to stick with the $150,000 profit forecast as a
useful handle on operations, and not to go any further—yet. The
figures could always be revised later if a proper basis for predicting
changing working capital needs could be found, which would be
done if a thorough analysis were made—a need that Mr. Hendricks felt
to be more and more acute as his work progressed. The assumption
of no working capital changes meant that net operating receipts in
each month would equal the month’s profits. At this stage Hendricks
did not have enough information to analyze the sales and cost com
ponents of net operating receipts in detail. Also, he did not allocate
tax payments to specific months. For these reasons, the artificial
operating inflow figure was used.
Hendricks allocated one-twelfth of the aggregate depreciation figure
and one-twelfth of 1964’s note amortization requirement to each
month’s inflows and outflows. Similarly, he assumed for the time being
that the $40,000 that Egyptian Express intended to spend in 1964 on
items other than equipment and the $100,000 slated for equipment
expenditures other than tractors would occur in equal monthly
installments.
In preparing the cash budget which appears in Exhibit 6, Hendricks
assumed that the tractor purchases could be postponed until June.
As a result of his discussion with Gray, Hendricks had inferred that
Mr. Willhite could be persuaded to wait until June if absolutely
necessary. He had further assumed that the $100,000 bank loan
could in fact be obtained if Egyptian Express waited until June after
anticipated profits began to materialize. In his cash budget projec
tions Hendricks drew down the bank line in six installments, starting
with $10,000 in June and continuing with amounts which offset the
monthly cash drain from July onwards. Under these conditions
Egyptian Express would exhaust the line with the seventh installment
in December.
A principal question Hendricks had posed for himself was: “Would
Egyptian Express’ inflows be sufficient to permit the purchase of five
tractors a month beginning in March?” Hendricks concluded that he
could answer this question by inspecting Exhibit 6 which assumed that
these purchases would be delayed until June; it was not necessary to
work out a separate cash budget based on the purchases taking place
in March in order to answer this question. His reasoning, described
below, was as follows.
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First, Hendricks noted from Gray’s comments that five tractors
would cost $50,000, and that after deducting the $25,000 trade-in
allowance, the net outflow in each month when five tractors were
purchased would amount to $25,000. Hendricks next examined Egyp
tian Express’ net cash position at the end of March presuming there
were no tractor purchases during the month; this balance, $24,123,
was reported in Exhibit 6. From this, he deduced that if five tractors
were purchased during March, the net cash position—$24,123 minus
$25,000—would show a deficit of $877 in the absence of additional out
side financing. Furthermore, if five tractors were purchased during
each of the five subsequent months according to management’s inten
tion, the negative cash position would not improve despite the projected
favorable upturn in business; Hendricks reached this conclusion using
the same procedure for subsequent months which he had employed to
evaluate the effect of the tractor purchases on the March ending cash
balance. Therefore, unless Egyptian Express was able to borrow sub
stantial sums beginning in March, the acquisition of the tractors would
have to be delayed. (The same, of course, applied to the purchase in
June.)
To obtain credit by March the company almost certainly would need
to begin negotiations with prospective lenders by the end of the current
month or early in February. Given the company’s anticipated financial
condition at this time, despite optimistic forecasts, Hendricks con
cluded that the possibility of obtaining a bank loan or other credit by
March was highly unlikely. Thus, he reasoned that Egyptian Express
would be hard put to acquire the new tractors in March.
In a more general sense, Hendricks concluded that Egyptian Express’
inflows during 1964 would hardly be sufficient for all the company’s
needs, including amortizing the installment contracts which would ma
ture during the year regardless of when the thirty tractors were
purchased. Hendricks observed that the cash budget substantiated this
conclusion despite its assumptions of high earnings and the successful
negotiation of a $100,000 bank line. Unless both of these optimistic
conditions materialized, the cash position appeared to be insufficient
for operating requirements throughout the year. The extent of the
inadequacy could be determined only after discussing with Mr. Will
hite the working capital requirements necessitated by the increased
level of anticipated activity.
At this point several things seemed clear to Hendricks. It might
be necessary for Egyptian Express to restrict expenditures early in the
year in order to survive. This would mean postponing the retirement
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of preferred stock and all purchases which were not essential. Re
ceivables could possibly be factored, if a factor could be found who
would accept a trucking company’s receivables. The alternative of
leasing essential equipment rather than purchasing it needed to be
explored, and also the possibility of a sale and leaseback of existing
equipment, although, because of existing encumbrances, very little,
net, would probably be realized from such a course. The situation
also suggested the need for stretching payables even further and
possibly postponing certain equipment obligations which would ma
ture early in the year. In this latter connection, care would have to
be exercised in selecting the most tolerant creditors to stall in order
to minimize the chances of being forced into bankruptcy. Timing was
also important because, with a few months of profitable operations at
forecast level under the belt, Willhite would be in a much better
position to look for deferrals, and in fact, if the next few months turned
out below forecast, Willhite’s plan to acquire new equipment would
be financially suspect, at best, or clearly unfeasible, at worst. Hen
dricks felt that Willhite should not commit himself to the expansion
program without a contingency plan in the event that the upturn
in sales and profits did not materialize. Finally, it might very well
be necessary to buy fewer new tractors than Mr. Willhite wanted if
sufficient additional financing could not be arranged, if internal cash
flows proved insufficient, and/or if leases could not be obtained. Under
these conditions the alternatives of overhauling the existing fleet of
tractors and buying used, reconditioned tractors ought to be explored.
The Meeting with the Client

Mr. Hendricks had a high regard for Egyptian Express Lines. He
believed the company provided a useful service to the communities it
served. He was quite eager to see it succeed in its battle for financial
survival. Thus he planned to stress the company’s cash problem at his
forthcoming review meeting with his client.
Mr. Hendricks began the meeting with Mr. Willhite with a brief
review of the 1963 audit report and then went on to a discussion of
the cash flow problem by explaining to Mr. Willhite the monthly cash
flow schedule and its meaning, and also its weaknesses in its present
“unrefined” state. Mr. Willhite was both surprised and alarmed by
the conclusions that Hendricks drew from his analysis, and he asked
Hendricks what he thought Egyptian Express should do.
In reply Hendricks outlined alternative ways of remedying the cash
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deficiency. He emphasized the importance of postponing specific
expenditures which were nonessential. He reminded Mr. Willhite of
all the “cash saving” options which were open to him: stretching
working capital by factoring receivables and/or delaying payables,
and the possibilities of buying fewer tractors, buying the tractors
later, buying used tractors, overhauling existing tractors, leasing the
required equipment or selling and leasing back existing equipment.
Hendricks said he could make no recommendation at that time as to
which, if any, of these options was preferable, but he did say that
he would be glad to study this matter if Mr. Willhite wished. He
pointed out that many of these alternatives involved matters of policy
for Egyptian Express. In any work he did in ranking alternatives
he would require guidance from Willhite as to their operating signifi
cance.
In addition, Hendricks called to Willhite’s attention the possibility
of obtaining a term loan from a bank in the summer if conditions
improved. Willhite was quite interested in this idea and immediately
stated that he would like to pursue it. He asked if he could meet
with Hendricks early in the next week to develop a basis for approach
ing the loan officer who handled the Egyptian Express account at
their local bank to test his reaction. Hendricks replied that he would
certainly do so, if Willhite wished. He suggested, however, that this
might be a little premature. “Maybe I didn’t emphasize this suf
ficiently, Wally,” he said, “but this monthly cash flow schedule is
almost certainly inaccurate insofar as the monthly details are con
cerned, although for the year as a whole it probably tells the story
with reasonable accuracy if the total profit forecast is correct. I put
it together at least partly because I wanted to dramatize for you
the serious financial position you may soon be in. I also wanted to
show you how helpful a detailed breakdown of future cash flows can
be as a device for planning ahead in such a critical area. Now, I
think you may be clutching at this bank loan idea I threw out like
a drowning man clutching at a straw. A $100,000 loan would cer
tainly help you; you’re basically under-capitalized, and you know it.
At the same time, let’s be frank: your credit record isn’t very good,
and I don’t think any bank will be wildly enthusiastic when you
go to see them. But, they’ll be far more interested in doing some
thing for you if you can make out a good case as to the soundness of
the loan, and most important, the ability of your company to meet all
its other obligations. Pious, honest, well-meaning assertions and
assurances on these points are all very well—but they are not enough,
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particularly in your case. If you go to the bank, Wally, you have to
have more than that.”
“W hat exactly are you leading up to, Snyder?” asked Willhite.
“Just this,” Hendricks replied. “As I said before, all I’ve done for
you so far is to establish that you have a cash flow problem, and to
dramatize it for you. I think the next step, and a most important and
valuable step for you, generally as well as specifically for your visit
to the bank, is for our firm to make a detailed analysis and forecast
of your cash flow over the next twelve months. By this I mean that
we should investigate and determine exactly what influences each
element in your cash flow, and then put together a forecast which
takes into account specifically what you think is going to happen over
the next twelve months to sales, terms, margins and costs. We ought
to take a look at your profit forecast too, and see how reasonable it is
in terms of your actual accomplishments to date and of what you
actually are going to do. We ought to analyze what will happen if
you do worse—or better—than you forecast. How much working
capital do you need to sustain increases in your volume? What will
happen if customers slow down their payments, and/or if creditors
start tightening up on you? Exactly what will your cash needs be,
month by month? Questions like these all need to be answered, and
if we have the answers, and a presentation to show to the loan officer
indicating ( I hope) that everything is well under control, and that you
are prepared for and can meet any probable contingencies, then not
only will he be impressed with your business and financial acumen,
but he will also be reassured on what to him are the basic questions
that a banker must ask. And, Wally, you will be better off too,
because you will have licked problems before they become problems.
Knowing the way your finances are going to turn out, or how they
are likely to turn out, will be a tremendous help to you. However,
there’s something else you have to be very, very aware of. You have
a fancy profit forecast for 1964, and we’re going to take a look at it
as part of our job. In the meanwhile, you should constantly be
thinking of what specifically you need to do to bring about the
dramatic profit improvement you have forecasted. Without a profit
boost like that, your plans to go on expanding are not too realistic.
Increasing your profitability, and maintaining that increase, is a key
or even the key to the problem.
Mr. Willhite thought for a moment, and then replied: “You know,
Snyder, I don’t think I have much choice. I’ve often wished I could
look ahead and prevent myself from getting into the cash binds I’ve
54

EGYPTIAN EXPRESS LINES, INC.

been through. This idea of yours about looking at my cash flow and
finding out what caused what, and how things are likely to turn out
this year makes a lot of sense. Let’s try it. Will it be a big job?”
“It shouldn’t be too big,” Hendricks replied. “I would estimate that
Tom Gray and a junior could do it in less than a week. They could be
through by the end of the month, so let’s plan to get together again
then, and see what to do next.”
“It’s a deal,” said Willhite, shaking hands as he stood up to leave.
“I really do appreciate your bringing this up.”
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Acton Machine Company
In late June 1964, the Acton Machine Company of Fort Worth,
Texas, was faced with the decision of whether or not to replace two
of its model 601 turret lathes with a more modern larger model 702
turret lathe. Acton performed metalworking on a subcontracting
basis for others and employed approximately forty people. The com
pany’s auditors were Field & Smathers, a local firm of certified public
accountants.
Acton Machine Company

The Acton Machine Company was the successor to Machinery Spe
cialties, which had been acquired for cash by Roy Peters in 1956. Un
der Peters’ direction the company’s revenues had risen from about
$200,000 in 1956 to over $500,000 during 1964. By mid-1964 Acton
Machine Company held large cash balances, the bulk of which was on
deposit in several savings and loan associations. Condensed compara
tive income statements and balance sheets for the fiscal years ended
May 31, 1963 and 1964 are presented in Exhibit 1 (page 57) and Ex
hibit 2 (pages 58-59).
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Exhibit 1

ACTON MACHINE COMPANY
Statements of Income
For the Years Ended May 31, 1963 and 1964
1964
Revenues* .....................................
Cost of sales
Outside labor and service ...........
Salaries/wages, direct labor
Total cost of sales .......................
Gross profit .......................
Operating expenses
Advertising ...................................
Alarm service ...............................
Autos & truck expense ...............
Audit, legal and professional
expenses .......................................
Commissions ................................
Contributions and donations .....
Dues and fees ...............................
Freight and cartage in ...............
Freight and cartage out .............
Heat, light, power .......................
Insurance .......................................
Laundry and linen service .........
Maintenance and repair .............
Miscellaneous expenses ...............
Office supplies and expense .....
Perishable tools ...........................
Rent ..............................................
Depreciation ................................
Salaries/wages, bonuses .............
Salaries/wages, officers ...............
Salaries/wages, overtime ...........
Salaries/wages, supervision
Sales expenses ...............................
Shop supplies ..............................
Taxes, payroll ...............................
Taxes, personal property ...........
Telephone and telegraph ...........
Travel ............................................
Total operating expense
Profit on operations
Corporate income tax
(federal & state) .......................
Profit after tax .............................

1963
$480,000

$510,000

$ 17,000
193,000

$ 18,000
200,000

210,000

218,000
$292,000
$

$270,000
$

500
300
3,000

600
300
2,700
3,100
15,400
100
200
3,100
1,500
6,000
4,000
100
4,000
100
1,000
19,000
14,000
33,000
14,000
27,000
21,000
38,000
5,400
8,500
7,000
5,000
2,000
3,100

3,200
17,000
100
200
3,000
1,700
6,500
4,500
100
4,300
100
1,000
20,000
14,000
30,000
16,000
28,000
22,000
32,000
6,100
10,000
8,000
5,000
2,100
4,000
242,700
$ 49,300

$ 30,800

24,000

15,000

$ 25,300

$ 15,800

239,200

* Includes bank interest $2,200 (1964), $1,750 (1963).
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Exhibit 2

ACTON MACHINE COMPANY
Comparative Balance Sheets
May 31, 1963 and 1964

ASSETS
5/31/64

5/31/63

Current assets:
Cash in savings and loan
account ...........................
Cash in Fort Worth
National Bank account
Petty cash fund ...............
Total cash
Accounts receivable, trade
Loans receivable,
employees .....................
Total receivables...............
Inventories
(finished goods) ...........
Inventories work
in process (direct labor)

$ 60,000

$ 40,000

25,000
200

30,000
200
$ 85,200

$ 20,000

$ 70,200
$ 21,000

2,000

—
$ 22,000

$

300

$ 21,000
$

2,200

Total inventories ...........
Total current assets
Fixed assets:
Automobiles and trucks
Allowance for depreciation

$ 5,000
(800)

Furniture and equipment,
office ...............................
Allowance for depreciation
Machinery and equipment
Allowance for depreciation

$ 2,000
(200)
$390,000
(120,000)

400
2,300

2,500

2,700

$109,700

$ 93,900

$ 4,200

$ 4,800
(600)
$

1,800
$270,000

1,800
(200)
$360,000
(90,000)

$ 4,200

1,600
$270,000

Total net fixed assets ......

$276,000

Total other assets .................

$ 31,760

$275,800
$ 20,160

Total assets ...........................

$417,460

$389,860
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Exhibit 2, continued
LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL
5/31/64

5/31/63

Current liabilities:
Accounts payable trade .........
Taxes payable ...........................
Accrued wages .........................
Accrued wages—bonuses

Total liabilities and capital

$ 5,300
1,000

$ 5,500
1,300

Total accrued expenses
payable ...................................
Total current liabilities ...........
Capital:
Common stock outstanding
Retained earnings ...................
Total capital stock and surplus

$ 4,100
29,000

$ 4,300
30,760

6,800

6,300

$ 41,860

$ 39,400
$200,000
150,460

$200,000
175,600
375,600

350,460

$417,460

$389,860

Source: Company records.

Acton Machine enjoyed a reputation for fine workmanship among
its customers, most of whom were capital goods manufacturers. Acton
Machine performed machining operations on castings provided by its
customers. According to Roy Peters the company simply sold time on
its machines and the skills of its labor force to others. One customer
in particular, Franklin Aerospace, provided some 70 per cent of Acton’s
revenues.
In addition to Roy Peters who was Acton Machine’s president and
sole owner, his youngest brother, Don, was also active in the company’s
management. Don Peters was nominally the treasurer. In practice,
however, he devoted much of his time to supervising the plant force
and to the scheduling of production jobs. In contrast, Roy Peters was
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more active in customer relations. Both men were in their early forties
and had been in the metalworking business for about twenty years.

Field &Smathers

In 1964, Field & Smathers had offices in Houston, San Antonio,
Dallas and Fort Worth. David Smathers, son of one of the founders
of the firm, was the partner in charge of the Fort Worth office. He
had joined the firm in 1952, after receiving his MBA degree.
One of his first moves, on joining the firm, had been to organize an
expansion of its activities into management services. No separate
management services group was set up, however, although a number of
non-CPA men with extensive business consulting service were hired
in the first few years to act as a nucleus of skilled manpower in the new
area. As the years went by, however, the firm took a series of steps to
improve its management services capabilities, including more selectiv
ity in hiring (strong emphasis being placed on obtaining more men
with MBA degrees) and attendance at various courses by partners
and senior audit staff. One of the first policies to be established was
to operate the management services activity as an integrated part of
the firm, rather than as a separate department, on the grounds that
individual partners and audit managers would be in the best position
to determine and act on clients’ needs for management services work.
Also, this policy acted as a means of cultivating support from senior
professional personnel for the idea of management services work.
David Smathers had felt it would be poor psychology to set up a sep
arate management services division in the early stages of the firm’s
work in this area. While over the years the firm did build up a strong
management services staff group, all management services work still
remained under the control of the audit partners and managers.
Most of the firm’s clients were small businessmen in the manufac
turing, retail and service industries. In addition, the firm did a con
siderable amount of work for several fast-growing oil producing com
panies whose owners had originally come to the firm for tax advice.
About 15 per cent of the firm’s total billings represented management
services work.
Practically all of this management services revenue came from
clients already retaining the firm for periodic audit and accounting
services. According to Smathers, their management services clients
“want somebody sitting on the phone ready to answer their questions
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whenever they come up with them.” In addition, however, all the
firm’s principals were encouraged to take the initiative in identifying
opportunities to be of service to their clients in the area of management
services; this was a matter of “thinking on your feet,” Smathers
claimed.
Field & Smathers became Acton Machine’s auditors in March 1959
after one of Field & Smathers long-time clients, a mill supply house,
recommended them to Roy Peters. At that time, Acton was experienc
ing rapid growth and Peters felt the need for professional help, not
only in the preparation of properly audited financial statements (pri
marily for credit reference and tax purposes), but also to ensure that
his accounting systems and procedures were adequate to meet the
needs of his expanding business. Since 1959 a very satisfactory rela
tionship had existed between Acton and Field & Smathers.
In June 1964, when David Smathers met with the Peters brothers
to review Acton’s May 31 fiscal year audited financial statements, the
discussion turned to some of the problems that were still plaguing
Acton in the area of financial and cost information. The latter had not
been a subject of much concern in Acton’s early days, but with the
steady increase in sales volume of the past few years, coupled with the
increasingly competitive nature of the machining subcontracting in
dustry, Roy Peters felt an increasing need for better operating data.
The upshot of this discussion was that one week later, after Field &
Smathers had submitted a formal proposal, the firm was hired to revise
Acton’s accounting system and procedures, and to install a standard
cost system. It was while Smathers was visiting Acton in connection
with this job that Roy Peters approached him with his problem on the
lathe acquisition.

The Lathe Acquisition

Roy Peters explained that he was trying to decide whether to service
a new long-term metalwork contract from Franklin Aerospace with
two of his old 601 machines, or to sell the two 601 machines and ac
quire a 702 machine to service the contract.
Previously, between 1959 and 1964, to permit the expansion of his
company, Roy Peters had purchased several pieces of equipment. On
one occasion, in the course of a previous consulting job for Acton,
Smathers had assisted Peters in the economic analysis related to the
purchase. Also, Smathers had informally helped Peters when the
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latter had obtained a loan from the Fort Worth National Bank to
finance this purchase. By June 1964 this loan had long since been
repaid.
Excerpts from the conversation in which Peters brought up the
problem are reproduced below.
Peters:

Dave, Franklin Aerospace just phoned and offered me a
four-year contract for the lathe work related to their new
government missile contract. Because Franklin Aerospace
is such an important customer, of course I couldn’t turn
their offer down. So I accepted the contract on the spot.
We will start on it in six weeks’ time.
Don has already figured out that the contract will return
to us our normal profit markup on machine time and labor
costs.
Now, I am wondering whether I should run this work
on those two old 601 lathes in the northwest corner of the
plant or purchase a larger 702 lathe to do the job. If I
bought a new lathe, I would sell the two 601 lathes be
cause I probably wouldn’t be needing them.
If you have a few moments, Dave, I would like to get
your thoughts on this possible equipment replacement be
fore I make a decision.

Smathers: What kind of a 702 lathe do you have in mind?
Peters:

Well, only last week, Hanson & Cole offered a new 702 to
me for $30,000 installed. I sure would like to get that ma
chine because a 702 lists for about $32,000. The Hanson &
Cole machine is a real bargain. Also, it can be installed
immediately.

Smathers: Tell me a little about this contract.
Peters:
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Well, Franklin Aerospace has a firm contract from the Air
Force to construct the new Felix missiles. Congress has
already approved appropriations necessary to complete the
contract, so there seems little chance that the contract will
be cancelled.
As far as we are concerned, we are to machine some
1,500 missile fins each year for four years. This contract
is noncancellable and provides for adjustments to the con-
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tract price for changes in labor rates. So I have plenty of
protection.
Smathers: How much can you sell the two 601’s for? As I recall, they
have a book value of about $8,000 each.
Peters:

As far as I can gather, I would be able to sell the two 601’s
for about $6,000 each. That would be my net after deduct
ing dismantling and removal costs. Usually, in the last
years of a lathe’s life, they sell somewhat below book value.
So, for instance, if I sold the 601’s next year I would expect
to net about $4,500 each.
If I keep them, the 601’s will continue to depreciate for
four more years, at which time they will be fully depre
ciated. The annual rate of depreciation on each 601 is
$2,000 for both tax and book purposes.

Smathers: What would be the cost difference between operating the
new lathe instead of the two old ones?
Peters:

With the new lathe I can definitely cut back my labor
force by one man. This means I would save about $5,000
a year in wages and fringe benefits over the life of the
machine. That’s one of the advantages of the labor market
in this area—I can cut my labor force whenever I want to.
Also, annual maintenance costs should be reduced slightly
—maybe on the average of $600 a year.

Smathers: Any other changes in costs or investment, such as perish
able tools or working capital?
Peters:

Nothing of importance.

Smathers: How long would you expect the new 702 lathe to be useful
to you?
Peters:

Well, it’s a new design, and ought to be good for about ten
years or so. I would guess that the resale value after ten
years would be about equal to the costs of removing it.

Smathers: Will you be able to get any more work done on the new
machine than on the two old 601’s?
Peters:
No—as far as the Franklin Aerospace contract is concerned,
the capacity of the new lathe will be equal to the two old
ones. In other words, the 702 will machine the missile fins
twice as fast as each 601. Keeping up with the Franklin
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Peters
Aerospace contract will be a full-time job for either the
(continued)new machine or the two old ones.
I don’t plan on using this equipment for any other jobs,
unless we get into two or more shifts. Then, of course, it
would depend on the type of job we ran on the lathes
whether or not we could get as much done on the 702 as on
the 601’s. For most types of jobs, the capacity of the 702
is about twice that of a 601.
As it now stands, however, I don’t plan to go into a
second shift or use the two 601’s or new 702 for anything
other than the Franklin job. And my other five turret
lathes should have enough capacity to handle the other
jobs that go through the plant.
Incidentally, buying the new lathe would not affect any
costs elsewhere in the plant. And the space occupied by
the two 601’s would just about be all taken up by the 702.
Smathers: Would the quality of the products produced on the two
601’s be the same as those produced on a 702?
Peters:

Well, that’s part of the problem. The 601’s are in good
shape now but I am afraid that they may not hold up so
well over the next few years. Typically, I can use a 601 to
meet the tolerances of the jobs that pass through the plant
for about ten years. These 601’s are six years old already so
you can see my concern.

Smathers: Of course, you will write the 702 off for tax purposes over
ten years on an accelerated basis.
Peters:

Yes.

Smathers: Any ideas as to how you would finance the 702 purchase?
Peters:

If I bought the 702 I would pay cash for it. I just don’t like
being in debt to anyone. The cash would come from the
$60,000 surplus funds I have on deposit in the savings and
loan accounts.

Smathers: Do you have any other uses for this money in the business?
Peters:
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No. As far as I can see, for the next few years the 702 is
the only major investment I will make in the business.
And, as you well know, I don’t wish to put my money any
where else but in the business or the bank. It’s not that I
don’t want to gamble, but I don’t like gambling outside of
the business. If I don’t buy the 702, I will keep the money
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on deposit. I expect these deposits will continue to earn
at least 4 per cent annual interest.
By the way, according to my cash projections, if I did
buy the 702 the firm would still have ample cash to meet
any foreseeable emergency during the next two years.
Clearly, we are not in a cash bind and I prefer to stay
that way.
Smathers: W hat did you plan to do when your 601’s have to be re
placed sometime about 1968?
Peters:

Well, first of all, let me say the 601’s could probably be sold
then for about what it will cost to remove them.
Frankly, Dave, I thought I would wait for a few more
years and then decide whether or not to replace the 601’s.
If they were replaced, and they would have to be if I
wanted to keep my capacity up, I would probably replace
them with a 702-type lathe, or a more advanced design if
one comes along.

Smathers: If you bought the 702 would you keep it after the Franklin
contract was completed?
Peters:

I guess if I bought the 702 now I might keep it after 1968,
or, just as likely, I might sell it. It would all depend on
what my business prospects looked like and what new
types of lathes were on the market.

Smathers: What do you estimate the resale value of the 702 would be
in four years’ time?
Peters:

That’s a hard one. I’ll be conservative and say we ought to
be able to sell it for at least book value after four years, if
we are using accelerated depreciation. I think the fast
writeoff for tax purposes comes fairly close to matching the
drop in market value for general purpose equipment such
as this.
W hat do you think, Dave, should I buy the 702 to service
the Franklin Aerospace contract?

Smathers: On the face of it, Roy, it looks like a good idea. You’ll be
investing $30,000 and saving about $5,600 per year before
taxes and depreciation. However, I think I’d like to analyze
the figures more closely before I give you a final opinion.
Let me have one of my associates in the office work on it
tomorrow, and we’ll talk again day after tomorrow. If the
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Smathers analysis takes as little time as I expect, we’ll throw the
(continued)hours onto the systems job, and not bill you separately.
Peters agreed to this, and the conversation turned to other subjects.
Questions

1. Do you need any more information before you could answer
Roy Peters’ question?
2. Using the information in the case, what recommendation would
you make to Peters?
3. W hat is your estimate of the amount of analysis which this prob
lem should receive? Is this a big enough problem that Smathers should
have planned to make it a “special project” for his client, perhaps
spending a sufficient amount of time to make an extra billing necessary?

COMMENTARY ON ACTON MACHINE COMPANY
Smathers’ Analysis

The following morning Smathers called one of the firm’s manage
ment services staff men, Stan Phillips, into his office. Phillips had
joined Field & Smathers earlier that month upon his graduation from
business school. Smathers felt that the computational exercise to be
performed for Acton would be a most suitable project for Phillips. It
was a matter of a few moments for Smathers to instruct Phillips in
what to do.
When he arrived at his desk the next morning, Smathers found
Phillips’ calculations on his desk. After reviewing them, and discussing
them with Phillips, Smathers drafted the following memorandum.
[FIELD & SMATHERS LETTERHEAD]
MEMORANDUM (DRAFT)
Date:
To:
From:
Subject:

June 27, 1964
Roy Peters, President, Acton Machine Company
David Smathers
Proposed purchase of 702 turret lathe

The calculations below indicate that the proposed investment will
produce a discounted rate of return of 17.4 per cent. This compares
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favorably with the 8 per cent + return presently being achieved from
operations. It is my recommendation that you make the investment,
subject to an evaluation of the risks involved, which is something
that you alone can assess. All of the savings calculations in this
memorandum are based on information provided by you, the accuracy
of which we are not in a position to evaluate.
Time-Adjusted Rate of Return. A time-adjusted rate of return analysis
seeks the internal rate of return on the investment in the 702 lathe.
The internal rate of return may be defined as the interest rate equiva
lent to the income which the investment will yield in addition to
returning the original expenditure.
In order to calculate the time-adjusted rate of return, three things
have to be known:
1. The relevant time period involved
2. The initial cash investment required for the 702 lathe
3. The differential future cash flows after taxes resulting from the
immediate cash outlay.
Relevant Period. The first question to answer is “W hat is the relevant
period to consider?” I feel we need only look at the four-year period,
1964-1968, the term of the Franklin Aerospace contract. This might
be an oversimplification, in that the physical and economic life of the
702 is expected to go beyond 1968. In any event, you would probably
be faced with a decision in 1968, when replacement of the present
601 lathes with newer equipment would probably be necessary in
order to maintain the machine shop’s capacity. However, the 1968
replacement decision should not influence the current analysis of
whether or not to buy a 702 lathe now. If you buy the 702 now, and
then in 1968 (after the Franklin Aerospace contract expires) you
decide to cut back capacity, you could probably sell the 702 for ap
proximately its book value since you have stated that there is an active
market for secondhand machines of recent vintage. In addition, I
think it is unrealistic to include in the calculations any data for the
period after 1968 since neither you nor I have any idea of what
revenues or costs would arise from the 702 once the Franklin contract
is completed. Thus, I view the current 702 purchase, and this analysis,
as being related solely to the Franklin contract.
In summary, 1964-1968 is the period over which the identifiable
differential cash flows arise. Also, we know that in about four years’
time the 601’s if retained, will most probably be scrapped. In addi
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tion, the 702, if purchased, could quite conceivably be sold after the
Franklin Aerospace contract is completed (in four years’ time). For
these reasons, the 702 can be considered as a replacement for the 601’s
solely to service the Franklin Aerospace contract. And your decision
to keep or dispose of the 702 in 1968 (equivalent to a replacement
purchase for the old 601’s) can be considered as a future decision
which in no way affects the decision to buy the 702 in 1964, assuming
the market price in 1968 will be approximately equal to depreciated
book value if bought now. The only difference is that failure to keep
the 702 in 1968 will result in 100 per cent refund of the investment
tax credit received on the purchase; thus at that time there will in
effect be a $2,100 premium for “inventorying” (retaining) the fouryear old 702.
(Clearly, however, there are other acceptable alternatives related
to the possible lives of the 601’s and the relevant time period. For
instance, the 601’s could be used to service the missile contracts and
then kept in operation for another six years but at increased main
tenance costs. To keep the 601’s past 1968 is not unrealistic since it
is doubtful that they will fall apart exactly four years hence. The 1968
prediction for their demise is based on past average experience. And
no doubt this average expected life can be easily lengthened through
increased maintenance care.)
Initial Cash Investment. The net initial cash investment in the 702 is
$13,900. This figure represents the difference between the invoiced
cost of the 702 and the cash benefits arising from the sale of the 601’s.
The initial cash outlay was calculated as follows:
Invoice cost of 702 installed
Less:
1. Investment tax credit (7%)1
2. Cash from sale of 601’s
Tax benefit arising from capital loss on
601’s (book value—sales price X 5 0 % )1 ..
Net cash benefit from sale of 601’s
Initial outlay

$30,000
(2,100)
$12,000
2,000
$14,000

(14,000)
$13,900

1 (Footnote by Smathers for file only.)
This is a delayed receipt as the benefits will not be received until sometime
in the future. Conceptually, the present value of the future receipt should
be included in this calculation. However, I regard this as an unnecessary
complication. Tax rate of 50 per cent is deliberate approximation.
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Differential Cash Flows. To calculate cash flow it is first necessary
to calculate net profit arising from the investment. The incremental
profits arise solely from operating savings related to the 702, after
giving effect to the differential for taxes due to different annual de
preciation charges on the new and old equipment. The computation
to determine these annual future profits is based on the assumption
that the installed costs of the 702 machine will be written off over
ten years using the double declining balance depreciation method.
(Revenues are not affected by the investment decision.) Adding back
the depreciation to the differential net profit produces differential cash
flow. In addition, since the relevant period is 1964-1968 it is assumed
that the 702 will be sold in 1968 at the price currently estimated to be
its value at that time. The detailed calculations are shown in Table
1, page 71 (all figures rounded to the nearest $100).
To calculate the time-adjusted rate of return it is necessary to
find the discount rate which makes the present value of the cash
inflows resulting from the 702 investment equal to the initial cash
outlay for the 702 lathe. This discount rate, which is the time-adjusted
rate of return, is found through a trial-and-error process.
Here are my calculations:

Trial I—14% Discount Rate

Net Cash
Discount*
Factor
Inflow
$ 3,800
.877
2
3,200
.769
3
2,700
.675
4
12,500
.592
Total present value of inflows
Initial investment
Net difference

Year

Present Value
of Inflows
$ 3,334
2,461
1,823
7,400
15,018
13,900
1,118

* Present value of $1 received n years from the present time.
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Trial II—18% Discount Rate

Year

Net Cash
Inflow

Discount
Factor*

Present Value
of Inflows

1
2
3
4

$ 3,800
3,200
2,700
12,500

.847
.718
.609
.516

$ 3,219
2,298
1,644
6,450
13,611
13,900

Total present value of inflows
Initial investment

(289)

Net difference
*Present value of $1 received n years from the present time.

Trial III—17% Discount Rate

Year

Net Cash
Inflow

Discount
Factor*

Present Value
of Inflows

1
2
3
4

$ 3,800
3,200
2,700
12,500

.855
.731
.624
.534

$ 3,249
2,339
1,685
6,675

Total present value of inflows
Initial investment
Net difference

13,948
13,900
48

*Present value of $1 received n years from the present time.

The above calculations show the time-adjusted rate of return on the
702 investment is about 17.4 per cent.
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2,400
$2,400
800
—
$3,200

1,800
$1,800
2,000
—
$3,800

(800)
$4,800

$ (800)

(2,000)
$3,600

($2,000)

$ 200

( 200)
—
$2,700

2,900
$2,900

200
$5,800

Year 3
Book Profit
and Income
Tax Calculation
$5,000
600
($3,800)
4,000
$ 900

(900)
10,200
$12,500

3,300
$3,200

900
$ 6,500

Year 4
Book Profit
and Income
Tax Calculation
$ 5,000
600
($3,100)
4,000

1 File note: deliberate approximation.
* Book value, end of 1966 is $30,000 - ($6,000 + 4,800 + 3,800 + 3,100) = $30,000 - $17,700 = $12,300 gross proceeds; subtract invest
ment credit refundable on sale after four years ($2,100); net proceeds $10,200.

Savings in labor ..............................
Savings in m aintenance ...................
Depreciation on 702 .......................
Less depreciation on 601’s .............
( H igher) lower depreciation
expense ........................... ,.............
Additional taxable income .............
Increase in income taxes
(50% rate )1 ..................................
Differential profit after ta x e s .........
Plus higher (minus lower) de
preciation expense [see above] ....
Plus resale of 702* ...........................
Differential cash flow .....................

Year 2
Book Profit
and Income
Tax Calculation
$5,000
600
($4,800)
4,000

Year 1
Book Profit
and Income
Tax Calculation
$5,000
600
($6,000)
4,000

ACTON MACHINE COMPANY
Calculation of Differential Profit
and Cash Flow on 702 Lathe

Table 1

ACTON MACHINE COMPANY

71

Rate of Return on Operating Investment. According to the 1964
financial statements, Acton’s current arithmetic return on investment
is about 8 per cent after taxes. The calculation of this figure, adjusted
to eliminate the low yield on the savings accounts, is shown below:
(Eliminating average of $55,000 held in savings banks during 1964
and $1,100 of interest income after taxes at 50 per cent)
1964 Profit on operations ($25,300 — $1,100)
1964 Average investment in operations
12/31/63 equity ....................................
12/31/64 equity
Average ..............................................
Less savings accounts

$ 24,200
$350,460
375,600
$363,030
55,000$308,030

24,200
= 7.9%
308,030

Rate of return on operations

As an alternative, an attempt can be made to calculate Acton’s
operating return on investment on a discounted cash flow basis, as
follows:
Year End 12/31/64

Year End 12/31/63

$25,300
30,000

$15,800
33,000

$55,300

$48,800

Profit after taxes ...........................
Depreciation
Total cash flow
Average cash flow $52,000
Equity ........................................
Less—savings accounts

$375,600
60,000

Operating equity

$315,600

The assumed life of the business as it presently stands is nine
years ($276,000 fixed assets depreciating at $30,000 per year). The
rate of return implied by an investment of $315,600 now to produce
a cash flow of $52,000 a year for nine years is slightly over 8.5 per cent.
This calculation is somewhat suspect, however, because it assumes
(1) that the business will continue throwing off cash at the rate of
$55,300 for nine years, and then stop, (2) that no capital investment
to maintain operation is refunded during the nine-year period; that
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at that time fixed assets will be worth nil and net current assets
realizable at book value.
Both of these assumptions are obviously oversimplifications, but the
result of this calculation tends to reinforce the arithmetic return
calculation of 8 per cent.
Conclusion. In view of the fact that the prospective return on the
investment in the 702 is 17.4 per cent (based on information provided
by you), which is not only an attractive return in its own right but
also considerably higher than the return on investment currently being
achieved from operations (8 per cent + ) , the investment seems to
be attractive. Since this is a “replacement” project (in a sense) the
level of risk may not be too great; it may in fact be lower than the
risk level inherent in the business as a whole. As you will understand,
however, we are not in a position to evaluate the risks involved in this
investment, since this is clearly a function of management. However,
we urge you to consider this factor very carefully before reaching your
decision.
Subject to your evaluation of the risk element, therefore, the pro
posed investment seems to be worth while.

Discussion with Peters

The following day Smathers met with Peters and reviewed his
analysis. When he reached his conclusions, he stressed verbally that
the question of risk was not one that he felt was in his province
to assess. After thinking for a few minutes, Peters stated his views
on this matter. Smathers noted down the main points of what Peters
said for his file reference.
Peters: “We have to consider the question ‘Is the promise of a 17.4
per cent return high enough to warrant assuming the risks associated
with the 702 investment?’ My answer to this question is ‘Yes.’
“The most important element of the overall risk related to the 702
investment is that a better lathe for the job might be placed on the
market in the near future, thus causing us to incur an ‘opportunity
loss’ because we bought too soon. This is not a major risk, since
your calculations assume the possible sale of the 702 in four years,
which is a short period of time. The risk is that a new model will
make the 702 obsolete and affect its resale value; I do not believe
this is a major risk.
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“Another risk is that we might impair Acton’s liquidity by swapping
highly liquid funds (bank deposits) for a fixed investment (702
lathe). However, according to my projections, the company has ample
funds to finance the acquisition of the 702 lathe and to meet any
emergencies. Hence, I conclude on this basis that the risk of a future
cash shortage due to the 702 investment is slight.
“A third aspect of the risk related to the 702 investment is that all
of the anticipated differential annual profits might not be realized. It
is almost certain that the estimated savings will not turn out to be
exactly the round figure of $5,600 anticipated. (I know that the
estimates I gave you were approximations.) However, I believe the
estimated differential profits will be very close to the projected figures
since there will be one less machine to tend. The bulk of the savings
come from the laying off of one man, which I know from experience
we can do without disturbing the labor situation elsewhere in the
plant; I believe the estimate of the saving is reasonable.
“Another dimension of the risk is the possibility that, obsolescence
aside, the estimated 1968 resale value of the 702 might be unrealistic
in 1968. I think my estimate is reasonable, ‘conservative,’ and I have
had considerable experience in these matters.
“Finally, there is always the risk that the Franklin Aerospace con
tract might be cancelled. A contract of this type might normally be
cancelled for at least one of two reasons: first, if Congress fails to
appropriate the necessary funds to complete the contract; second, if
we fail to meet the contract’s quality standards. I think that neither
of these events is likely to occur. The contract is reasonably firm since
in the Air Force’s estimation Congress has already appropriated ade
quate funds for the project. Also, our work has apparently satisfied
Franklin Aerospace in the past and I see no evidence to indicate that
we will not continue to do acceptable work.
“Based on these assumptions and this analysis, I conclude that the
702 investment involves a low degree of risk. In my opinion, the level
of risk is almost certainly less than the average degree of risk involved
in our business, for many reasons other than the one you suggested
in your memo.”
Smathers also noted that the next day, after the meeting, Peters
placed an order for a 702 lathe and made arrangements to sell his
two old 601 lathes.
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Slatka Tool and Mold Corporation
Glenn Fisher, manager of management services in the Cleveland
office of Mabry and Tallent, returned from an out of town engagement
on May 15, 1960 to find a telephone message on his desk from George
Ostle, vice president and general manager of Slatka Tool and Mold
Corporation. Over the years Ostle had become accustomed to dis
cussing most of his major plans and problems with Fisher.
When he returned Ostle’s call Fisher learned that Slatka’s manage
ment had reached a decision that a new Seymour Precision Surface
Grinder was needed in the plant to replace several smaller grinding
machines which lacked the precision and flexibility available with the
Seymour machine. The decision had been made primarily on tech
nical and marketing grounds, as being a necessary addition to main
tain the company’s technical superiority over competitors. The in
stalled cost of the grinder and supporting equipment was approxi
mately $144,000, a sum that Ostle pointed out was in excess of the
funds available from internal sources. He asked Fisher if he would
help him evaluate the various alternative sources of external capital
which could be used to finance the purchase of the new equipment.
Fisher agreed to visit Ostle that afternoon to look into the problem.
Slatka Tool and Mold Corporation

In the mid-1930’s, John Slatka—a Russian immigrant and master tool
and die maker—opened a small tool and die shop in Cleveland’s in
dustrial district. He managed to secure sufficient business to operate
profitably right from the start. Slatka’s reputation for quality work
grew and the business survived the usual problems of new enterprises.
Mr. Slatka’s son, Peter, joined his father in the business in 1937.
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By 1941, the younger Slatka—destined to become one of the leading
tool and die casting designers in the country—was sufficiently wed to
the industry to seek active control of the business. He purchased his
father’s interest, and the elder man, then in his sixties, relinquished
direct control of operations. However, even in 1960, John Slatka was
actively interested in the company’s affairs.
The company continued to grow after Peter Slatka took control.
He chose to concentrate his efforts primarily in the manufacturing of
die casting dies. As a result he engaged in relatively little work that
was directly defense connected. During the war period, George Ostle
joined the firm as office manager. He became Slatka’s partner in 1950.
After the end of World War II, the Slatka Tool Company (as it
was called then) purchased surplus equipment from the federal gov
ernment. Volume increased and the firm entered a period of fairly
rapid growth. By 1948 the company had expanded to the point where
it had outgrown its ability to finance further expansion from internal
or family sources. Peter Slatka approached the State National Bank
for supplementary capital.
When Mr. Slatka outlined his needs, the bank officer with whom
he conferred pointed out that his unaudited financial statements
lacked the reliability that was necessary for bank review. Since Slatka
indicated that he was perfectly willing to have his financial statements
audited, but did not know how to go about it, the banker recom
mended that Slatka contact one of a list of six CPA firms of excellent
reputation that he showed Slatka. Slatka contacted Mabry and
Tallent, who became Slatka Tool Company’s auditors and have re
mained as such ever since.
In the 1950’s, Slatka Tool continued to grow and to prosper. The
business progressed from proprietorship to partnership to the corporate
form. By 1955-56, the company was in a position to take advantage
of technology changes that created new and significant opportunities
for firms in the die casting business. The plant facilities had twice
been enlarged from the shop that John Slatka had originally estab
lished in the thirties. New techniques in die casting promised to
create even greater opportunities in the future.
Up until the mid-1950’s, die casting techniques had been found
appropriate only for relatively small, easy to handle work. Much of
Slatka’s volume was in the automotive line. The company manufac
tured tools and dies for components and hardware such as carburetor
housings, escutcheons, door handles, grilles, and similar pieces. How
ever, with the successful application of die casting techniques to
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larger parts (such as transmission housings and engine blocks) an
entire new range of activity was introduced.
In the late 1950’s, Peter Slatka successfully designed and engineered
a large size die casting mold that was favorably received by a major
automotive manufacturer. After a lengthy period of trial and testing,
the manufacturer advised Slatka of his satisfaction with the mold, and
three more molds were ordered at that time. Further orders of this
type followed.
By 1960, the Slatka Tool and Mold Corporation had achieved a
recognized position of prominence in its field. In 1960, the company
employed a force of approximately eighty men. Annual sales volume
in the fiscal year ended April 3 0 , 1960, was a little less than $2.4 million
and the investment in plant facilities (working capital excluded) was
approximately $1.2 million. Total current assets as of April 30, 1960,
were $337,000. (See Exhibit 1, pages 78-79, for five-year comparative
balance sheets; see Exhibit 2, page 80, for earnings statements for
the same years.)
Mabry and Tallent

Mabry and Tallent was an old established CPA firm with offices
in Cleveland, Cincinnati and Dayton, Ohio. The firm had come into
existence as a result of the merger of the accounting practices of
George Mabry of Cleveland and Harold Tallent of Cincinnati; five
years after the amalgamation an office was opened in Dayton to
serve the needs of several clients who had expanded their operations
to that city. The firm’s clients were primarily small and medium sized
industrial companies. As their clients grew and prospered, so also did
Mabry and Tallent expand their activities to meet their clients’ needs.
A management services department was set up in the late 1950’s, with
staff groups in both the Cleveland and Cincinnati offices, headed by a
manager.
Glenn Fisher, CPA and manager of the management services depart
ment at the Cleveland office, had developed familiarity with the
Slatka account in a variety of capacities during his association with
Mabry and Tallent. He was first exposed to the account in 1950;
over the years he had become intimately familiar with the background,
operations, problems, and philosophy of the Slatka Tool and Mold
Corporation. In the early stages of the CPA-client relationship, he
had served Slatka in a combined audit and review capacity. When
he was transferred to the management services department, his audit
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Inventory ................................... ................................
Prepaid expenses.......................................................
Total current assets.......................................................
Fixed assets:
Machinery, tools and equipment (net) .................
L a n d ...........................................................................
Total fixed assets...........................................................
Other assets:
Cash surrender value of life insurance ...................
Note receivable.........................................................
Total other assets.........................................................
Total assets....................................................................

Less: allowance for uncollected accounts ...............

ASSETS
Current assets:
Cash ...........................................................................
Receivables: trade ..................................................
o th er...................................................
Officer’s note .............................................................
$ 118,854
3,500
$ 115,354
$ 116,111
10,034
$ 265,127

$ 51,353
$ 120,541
6,999
$ 127,540
3,500
$ 124,040
$ 77,888
11,384
$ 264,665
$1,191,544
$1,191,544

$
1,500
$
1,500
$1,457,709

$ 15,268
$ 51,759
5,425
28,000
$ 85,184
2,750
$ 82,434
$ 99,737
4,030
$ 201,469
$1,191,955
$1,191,955

—
$1,393,424

4,518
1,500
$
6,018
$1,562,231

$

$

1,948
1,500
$
3,448
$1,472,212

$1,266,583

$1,266,583

$ 114,736
3,500
$ 111,236
$ 105,319
11,916
$ 289,630

$ 61,159
$ 112,953
1,783

1959

$1,203,637

$1,203,637

$ 23,628
$ 114,359
4,495

1957

1956

April 30,
1958

SLATKA TOOL AND MOLD CORPORATION
Comparative Balance Sheets, April 3 0 , 1956-1960

6,634
5,000
$ 11,634
$1,586,711

$

$1,218,250
19,912
$1,238,162

$ 108,678
3,500
$ 105,178
$ 138,734
15,904
$ 336,915

$ 77,099
$ 106,209
2,469

1960
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4,802
20,375
2,043
8,100
2,768
$ 158,321
$ 22,240
$ 355,800
4,682
931,169
$1,291,651
$1,472,212

$ 355,800
4,682
883,079
$1,243,561
$1,457,709

16,656

3,219
18,948
2,364
4,100
3,896
$ 214,148
—

$
53,627
10,450
39,500

40,000

1958

9,900
85,374
14,347
32,000

$

1957

28,545
22,568
2,586

24,859
14,325
38,000

60,000
16,656

$ 355,800
4,682
980,031
$1,340,513
$1,562,231

8,595
$ 216,134
$
5,584

$

1959

29,402
25,275
2,396
1,237

37,346
12,310
31,000

15,000

$ 355,800
4,682
1,018,513
$1,378,995
$1,586,711

$ 153,966
$ 53,750

$

1960

* 6 per cent secured installment bank loan, payable in monthly installments of $1,250 plus interest; shown net of current
portion.
Source: Mabry & Tallent files.

1956
LIABILITIES
Current liabilities:
Notes p a y a b le ........................................................... $ 70,000
Current portion of 6% installment lo a n .................
Equipment purchase contract .................................
Accounts payable, tra d e ...........................................
57,992
Payroll deductions ...................................................
14,884
Income ta x e s .............................................................
Accruals:
Payrolls...................................................................
Vacations ...............................................................
16,446
Taxes other than incom e .......................................
34,259
Bonuses...................................................................
Due officers...........................................................
38
Total current liabilities ............................................... $ 193,619
Long-term d e b t* ...........................................................
—
Owners’ equity:
Common stock........................................................... $ 355,800
Additional paid-in c a p ita l .......................................
Retained earnings .....................................................
844,005
Total equity ................................................................... $1,199,805
Total liabilities and e q u ity ......................................... $1,393,424

SLATKA TOOL AND MOLD CORPORATION

79

80

* Primarily contributions to employees’ pension plans.
Source: Mabry & Tallent files.

$ 44,285

Net income ...................................................................

78,115
33,830

$

Earnings before taxes...................................................

77,361
754

65,274
96,920

Federal income ta x e s...................................................

$

1

Operating profit ...........................................................
Other income ...............................................................
Other Expenses*...........................................................

Administrative expenses .............................................

$
$

Gross profit on sa le s.....................................................
Selling E xpenses...........................................................

174,281
31,646

$2,101,551
1,927,270

Net sales .......................................................................
Cost of sa le s...................................................................

1956

251,018
44,304

$

$

$

39,074

32,000

71,074

70,216
5,318
(4,460)

136,498
$ 180,802

$
$

$2,411,013
2,159,995

1957

$

$

$

48,090

39,500

87,590

93,476
12,762
(18,648)

142,447
$ 180,993

$ 274,469
$ 38,546

$2,576,434
2,301,965

1958

SLATKA TOOL AND MOLD CORPORATION
Comparative Income Statements
For the Years Ended April 3 0 , 1956-1960

$

$

$

48,862

38,000

86,862

90,793
14,741
(18,672)

143,301
$ 176,230

$ 267,023
$ 32,929

$2,407,312
2,140,289

1959

$

$

38,482

31,000

69,482

$ 81,256
9,562
(21,336)

128,109
$ 169,065

$ 250,321
$ 40,956

$2,389,198
2,138,877

1960

Exhibit 2
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responsibilities had been assumed by a manager on the audit staff,
but he had remained in close contact with Slatka through various
management services projects that he had been requested to under
take. By 1959 Slatka had found his continuing advice so useful that
they had entered into a separate annual retainer agreement with
Mabry and Tallent for management services in addition to their
audit retainer. Fisher had continued to serve the account when he
became manager of management services because of his close famil
iarity with the company and its executives.
Meeting with Ostle

At his meeting with Ostle that afternoon, Fisher’s first questions con
cerned the proposed investment as such. Ostle explained that for some
time Slatka’s executives had been aware that their surface grinding
equipment would have to be replaced. Their existing equipment was
in reasonably good condition, but several breakthroughs in grinding
equipment design and manufacture had effectively made obsolete
what they had. Several of Slatka’s competitors had installed new Sey
mour equipment, and Slatka’s customers were putting pressure on
them to do likewise. Slatka’s leadership of the industry was being
challenged, and Peter Slatka had eventually decided that his company
had no option but to install the Seymour equipment. Inquiries to the
Seymour sales department had indicated that Seymour was offering
five-year terms under a chattel mortgage contract, with annual pay
ments of $28,800 (payable one-twelfth monthly). Peter Slatka had
discussed Seymour’s offer with Ostle, and both had felt some hesitancy
at the extent of the commitment that would be involved. As one al
ternative, Ostle had obtained a quotation from Guarantee Equipment
Leasing Co. of Cincinnati, Ohio, for a financial lease (all ownership
costs payable by lessee). Their rate was $21 per month per $1,000 of
acquisition cost, for the first five years. Thereafter, for years six
through ten, the monthly rental would be only $1.90 per month per
$1,000. After receiving this proposal, Ostle and Peter Slatka had de
cided that they needed Fisher’s advice.
Fisher pointed out that yet a third alternative was available, namely
borrowing the purchase price from the company’s bank and buying the
equipment outright. Ostle admitted that he had not considered this
alternative. He added that he was dubious as to whether Slatka’s bank,
the State National Bank, would consider granting them a loan of this
size because they had just recently negotiated a five-year unsecured
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loan of $75,000 (repayable in monthly installments of $1,250, plus
interest). The proceeds of this loan had been applied primarily to the
discharge of the company’s $60,000 note to the bank which had
matured on November 30, 1959. Ostle remarked that he was reluctant
to get “into the bank” too far. Also, he felt it might be too soon to
approach the bank for another long-term loan.
Fisher replied that he had known, of course, about the $75,000 loan,
but that he considered this prime evidence of the bank’s willingness to
meet its customers’ needs. He reminded Ostle that the company had
always had an excellent relationship with the bank, had always met
its obligations on time, and had been a loyal and increasingly im
portant customer of the bank since 1948. Ostle agreed that the com
pany was in good standing with the bank; after some further dis
cussion of pros and cons he agreed that it might be worthwhile to
check with them and said he would do so the following day and let
Fisher know what the bank’s attitude was.
Fisher inquired about the cash purchase price of the machinery,
adding that he assumed it would be something less than $144,000.
Ostle referred to some papers on his desk and told Fisher that the
Seymour Company quoted a price of $126,000 (thirty days, net) as
an alternative to their installment offer.
Finally, Fisher inquired about the company’s intention with regard
to the machinery which was to be replaced. Ostle informed him that
with the rapid technological changes which were taking place in his
industry, he doubted whether the existing machinery could be sold
for more than $10,000. The company would incur costs of at least
this amount in connection with the changeover for partly dismantling,
packing and shipping the old machinery, for breaking a hole into the
plant wall to bring the Seymour equipment in, for rebuilding the wall,
and for retraining some of its skilled machinists.
Program of Action

At this point, Fisher outlined the following three-point program
which he felt was appropriate for the problem at hand.
1. Obtain details on possible bank financing
2. Schedule cash flows from three alternatives
3. Determine which alternative would best fit the company’s needs.
He added that he would be glad to undertake steps 2 and 3, working
with Ostle on step 3, and anticipated that the project could be com
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pleted well within a week. It would probably require one day of his
own time and one day’s time of one of his assistants. Ostle approved
Fisher’s proposal, and promised to call Fisher the next day after he
had been to the State National Bank.
The State National Bank’s Proposal

The following day Ostle called Fisher to say that, contrary to his
expectation, he had had a sympathetic hearing from the loan officer,
Keith Garnett. Their meeting had lasted two hours, and had included
a detailed discussion of Slatka’s present position, its plans, and its
prospects. Garnett had accepted Ostle’s contention that purchase of
the Seymour equipment was a competitive necessity; in fact, he had
remarked that he was pleased to see that Slatka was willing to under
take a major commitment in order to maintain its position in the
industry. He said he would have felt much more disturbed (and
would have been concerned about the safety of the existing loan) if
Slatka had let things slide and eventually lost its dominant position.
By the end of the meeting Garnett had worked out a proposal for
Slatka which he said he would support when it came before the bank’s
loan committee, and which he was sure would be approved. The
proposal was as follows:
1. Slatka would consolidate $54,000 of its present loan with the
new loan, making a total of $180,000, and would adjust its April 1961
payment on the present loan so as to leave $54,000 outstanding on
that date.
2. The new loan would be secured by a general mortgage on all
Slatka’s plant and machinery, and would bear interest at 6 per cent,
payable monthly.
3. Repayments on the new loan would be made monthly, at the
rate of $1,000 per month for the first year (while the current balance
of the existing loan was being paid off), then at the rate of $2,000 per
month for the next five years, and $1,000 per month for the last four
years.
4. Until the consolidated loan was reduced to $48,000, Slatka would
observe the following restrictions and obligations:
• Limit executive salaries to present levels
• Limit dividends to 50 per cent of current earnings
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• Not contract any short-term borrowing or any further long-term
debt or any lease or conditional sales agreement without the prior
consent of the bank
• Maintain working capital of at least $100,000
• Submit monthly financial statements to the bank by the 15th of each
succeeding month
• Submit semi-annual audited financial statements within six weeks
of each fiscal half-year.
Ostle remarked to Fisher that he wasn’t sure it was worth it to have
the company committed to all these conditions, but he did want Fisher
to evaluate this financing route along with the others in his analysis.
Fisher indicated that he would have some preliminary figuring com
pleted within a day or two, and would check back with Ostle when he
was ready to talk further.
Questions

1. W hat factors should be considered when comparing the three
alternative financing plans?
2. Is Fisher’s “program for action” adequate?
3. W hat additional information is required to complete the analysis?
4. Outline the steps to be followed in the analysis.
5. As far as is possible with the data available, analyze the data and
prepare your recommendation to Mr. Ostle. Support your recommen
dation with appropriate calculations and/or schedules.
6. Appraise the validity of the point of view that, generally, the
alternative that requires the lowest cash outlay is the most desirable.
What other criteria might be used in evaluating the alternatives?
COMMENTARY ON SLATKA TOOL AND
MOLD CORPORATION
Fisher’s Analysis and Report

The following day Fisher called one of his staff men into his office,
explained the Slatka problem and the alternatives, and requested him
to calculate the cash flows for each of the alternatives. In discussing
the assignment Fisher laid down the following ground rules:
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1. Only after-tax cash flows were to be considered, especially be
cause the impact of taxes differed markedly between ownership and
leasing.
2. It was to be assumed that the new machinery was installed and
paid for on May 1, 1960, the beginning of Slatka’s 1961 fiscal year.
This, of course, was a “convenience” assumption, since it was already
mid May, but it simplified the calculations and the actual installation
date would not make any material difference in evaluating alternative
financing plans.
3. Depreciation on the new machinery was to be computed on a
basis consistent with Slatka’s current practice, i.e., ten-year doubledeclining balance, or 20 per cent per year on the undepreciated bal
ance at the beginning of the year.
4. No consideration was to be given to the following items which
were the same for all three alternatives:
a. proceeds from the disposal of the old equipment
b. any tax loss related to the disposal of the old equipment
c. the reduction in depreciation expense by virtue of disposal of the
old equipment.
5. Present value analysis was not to be used at this stage even
though it clearly could be used for this type of problem. Fisher felt
that present value would not be understood too easily by Ostle; also,
the question at hand was one of selecting a financing alternative, not of
appraising an investment decision as such. Thus the actual magnitude
of cash flows and their timing were of overriding importance in abso
lute terms, at least initially. Present values would be calculated subse
quently if the “first cut” calculations indicated the necessity or ap
propriateness of doing so.
That same afternoon Fisher’s staff man brought in to him a series of
schedules he had worked up. He explained to Fisher that his pro
cedure had been as follows:
1. Compute annual bank interest on a 6 per cent loan, repayable in
equal monthly installments ( Exhibit 3, page 86).
2. Schedule capital and after-tax interest payments on the proposed
bank loan and the existing bank loan; deduct the latter from the
former to determine the actual (“marginal”) cash flow arising from
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extension of the loan to include the $126,000 of new financing (Ex
hibit 4, pages 88-89). Payments for the 1961 fiscal year on the current
loan were ignored because they were common to both alternatives.
Also, the beginning balance on the old loan was shown as $54,000

Exhibit 3
SLATKA TOOL AND MOLD CORPORATION
Bank Interest on $12,000
Repaid Monthly, at 6 per cent

Month
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Capital Balance
for Month
$12,000
11,000
10,000
9,000
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000

(a) If loan were $15,000, interest would be

6% Interest
( = ½ % /M onth)
$ 60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
390

12,000

y $390 = $488.

(b) If loan were $9,000 (for seven months)
9
interest would be 7 ($35+ 30+25+20+ 15+ 10+5)
9
X $140
7
= $180.
Note: (a) applies to “old loan”—see schedule of loan capital and
interest payments—1962 fiscal year
(b) same—1965 fiscal year.
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rather than $53,750 in order to keep the amount of new financing at
$126,000 ($180,000 - $54,000). The difference of $250 (representing
a “plus” cash flow in the 1961 fiscal year) was too small to take into
account.
3. Compute depreciation and the consequent tax shield for the
purchase alternative (Exhibit 5, page 90).
4. Compute annual cash flow on the installment payment alterna
tive, including provision for the tax shield on the interest element in
the payments, assumed to be allocated equally to each year’s (equal)
payments (Exhibit 6, page 90).
5. Compute the after-tax costs of leasing (Exhibit 7, page 91).
6. Summarize total costs under each alternative (Exhibit 8, page
91). The staff man pointed out that he had deducted the undepre
ciated book value of the assets at the end of ten years from the costs
of the ownership alternatives to bring out the fact that under the leas
ing alternative Slatka would obviously not own the equipment at the
end of the period. He added, however, that he thought that this de
duction might be too big, in that it might be unlikely that the equip
ment would be worth book value at that time. However, the minimum
deduction at the end of ten years would be the tax shield available if
the equipment were scrapped, i.e., $6,864 (52 per cent of $13,200).
7. Summarize and compare the alternatives (Exhibit 9, pages 9293). The two ownership alternatives were compared without adjusting
for the depreciation tax shield, since this was common to both. The tax
shield was taken into account, however, when comparing each of the
ownership alternatives to leasing.
When he reviewed the schedules his staff man had prepared, Fisher
was even more convinced that present value or discounted cash flow
analysis was not appropriate in this instance, since the decision could,
he felt, be reached on qualitative grounds, i.e., on the basis of an
assessment of the company’s ability to support the various cash flows,
compared with the costs associated with each alternative. However,
for his ow n reference Fisher h ad this present value analysis m ade:

bank financing vs. installment purchase (Exhibit 10, page 94), and
bank financing vs. leasing (Exhibit 11, page 94). In these calculations
Fisher took the respective differential cash flows shown on Exhibit 9
and by trial-and-error determined the rate of return that would equate
87

SLATKA TOOL AND MOLD CORPORATION
Rank Loan —Capital and Interest Payments
Fiscal Year
1961

1962

1963

New loan
Beginning balance ....................................

180,000

168,000

144,000

Payments ................................................

12,000

24,000

24,000

Ending b alan ce..........................................

168,000

144,000

120,000

Interest
6% on ending b alan ce..........................

10,080

8,640

7,200

8% on payments (based on Ex. 3 ) ......

390

780

780

Total in terest..............................................

10,470

9,420

7,980

Less tax shield —52% ..............................

5,444

4,898

4,150

Net interest cost..........................................

5,026

4,522

3,830

Total cash flow —payments and
net in terest..........................................

17,026

28,522

27,830

Old loan
Beginning balance.....................................

54,000

39,000

Payments ...............................................

15,000

15,000

Ending balance.........................................

39,000

24,000

Interest
6% on ending b alan ce..........................

2,340

1,440

6% on payments (based on Ex. 3 ) .......

488

488

Total in terest.............................................

2,828

1,928

Less tax shield —52% .............................

1,471

1,003

Net interest c o s t.......................................

1,357

925

Total cash flow —payments and
net interest..........................................

16,357

15,925

12,165

11,905

Excess of total cash flow for new loan
over old lo a n ......................................

88
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1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

120,000

96,000

72,000

48,000

36,000

24,000

12,000

24,000

24,000

24,000

12,000

12,000

12,000

12,000

96,000

72,000

48,000

36,000

24,000

12,000

0

5,760

4,320

2,880

2,160

1,440

720

0

780

780

780

390

390

390

390

6,540

5,100

3,660

2,550

1,830

1,110

390

3,401

2,652

1,903

1,326

952

577

203

3,139

2,448

1,757

1,224

878

533

187

27,139

26,448

25,757

13,224

12,878

12,533

12,187

24,000

9,000

15,000

9,000

9,000

0

540

0

488

180

1,028

180

535

94

493

86

15,493

9,086

11,646

17,362

25,757

13,224

12,878

12,533

12,187

(Total 146,683)
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Depreciation and Tax Shield

Fiscal
Year
1961
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
70
71

Balance
Beginning of Year
$126,000
100,800
80,600
64,500
51,600
40,300
32,200
25,800
20,600
16,500
13,200

Depreciation*
(20% D.B.)
$ 25,200
20,200
16,100
12,900
11,300
8,100
6,400
5,200
4,100
3,300

Tax Shield
(52% X Depreciation)
$13,100
10,500
8,400
6,700
5,900
4,200
3,300
2,700
2,100
1,700

$112,800

$58,600

* Rounded to nearest $100.

Exhibit 6
SLATKA TOOL AND MOLD CORPORATION
Installment Payment Alternative
Annual Cash Flow

Total payments .........................
Cash cost of equipm ent...........

Total
$144,000
126,000

“Interest” element in
installment payments ...........
Tax shield—52%

18,000
(9,360)

Net cash flow
(total less tax shield)
90

$134,640

Annual
(Five Years)
$28,800

3,600
(1,872)
$26,928

SLATKA TOOL AND MOLD CORPORATION

Exhibit 7
SLATKA TOOL AND MOLD CORPORATION
Lease Costs
( Based on Equipment Cash Cost of $126,000)
Rate
Rent
Annual After-Tax
Years
(Per $M/Month) Month
Year Cost (48% of Rent)
1-5 (fiscal 1961-65)
$21.00
$2,646.00 $31,752
$15,240
6-10 (fiscal 1966-70)
$ 1.90
239.40
2,873
1,380
$16,620
X 5 = $83,100

Exhibit 8
SLATKA TOOL AND MOLD CORPORATION
Summary of Total Costs
Bank
Finance
Total after-tax cost, before
depreciation ......................................
Less: depreciation tax shield ...........

Installment Ten-Year
Purchase
Lease

$146,683
58,600
$ 88,083

$134,640
58,600
$ 76,040

$83,100
—
$83,100

Rook value of equipment, end of
13,200
tenth year .........................................
Net cost .............................................. . $ 74,883

13,200
$ 62,840

—
$83,100

Note: If tax shield from scrapping,
$6864 ( 52% of $13,200), is deducted
instead of book value, the net costs
would b e .................................................

$ 69,176

$83,100

$ 81,219
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Comparison of Alternatives
Fiscal Year
1961

1962

1963

1964

Ownership cash flows
(1) Net Cash outflow,
bank financing (Ex. 4) .....

17,026

12,165

11,905

11,646

(2) Net cash outflow, install
ment purchase (Ex. 6) .....

26,928

26,928

26,928

26,928

(3) Bank financing favorable
[2-1] ( unfavorable) b y ...............

9,902

14,763

15,023

15,282

(4) Ownership depreciation
tax shield (Ex. 5) .............

13,100

10,500

8,400

6,700

3,926

1,665

3,505

4,946

[2-4] ( installment purchase less
depreciation tax shield) .....

13,828

16,428

18,528

20,228

Leasing cash flows
(7) Net rental cost ( Ex. 7 ) .......

15,240

15,240

15,240

15,240

Ownership vs. leasing
(8) Ownership via bank
[7-5] financing better (worse)
than leasing b y ...................

11,314

13,575

11,735

10,294

1,412

( 1,188)

(3,288)

(4,988)

(5) Ownership (bank)
net cash outflow
[1-4] (bank financing less
depreciation tax shield) .....
(6) Ownership (installment)
net cash outflow (inflow)

(9) Ownership via
[7-6] installment purchase
better (worse) than
leasing b y ...........................
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Exhibit 9
1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

Total

17,362

25,757

13,224

12,878

12,533

12,187

146,683

26,928

—

—

—

—

—

134,640

9,566

(25,757)

(13,224)

(12,878)

(12,533)

(12,187)

(12,043)

5,900

4,200

3,300

2,700

2,100

1,700

58,600

11,462

21,557

9,924

10,178

10,433

10,487

88,083

21,028

(4,200)

(3,300)

(2,700)

(2,100)

(1,700)

76,040

15,240

1,380

1,380

1,380

1,380

1,380

83,100

(20,177)

(8,544)

(8,798)

(9,053)

(9,107)

(4,983)

5,580

4,680

4,080

3,480

3,080

7,060*

3,778

(5,788)

* Plus net residual value (if any); book value $13,200; tax shield, if scrapped,
$6,864.
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Exhibit 10
SLATKA TOOL AND MOLD CORPORATION
Rate of Return, Bank
Financing vs. Installment Purchase
Bank Financing Better/
(W orse) than Installment Discount
5%
Year Line 3, Exhibit 9
$ 9,902
.952
1961
14,763
.907
1962
15,023
.864
1963
15,282
.823
1964
9,566
.784
1965
.746
(25,757)
1966
(13,224)
.711
1967
(12,878)
.677
1968
.645
(12,533)
1969
(12,187)
.614
1970
Totals

Factor
3.5%
.966
.934
.902
.871
.842
.814
.786
.759
.734
.709

$(12,043)

Present Value
3.5%
5%
$ 9,565
$ 9,427
13,788
13,390
13,551
12,980
13,311
12,577
8,055
7,500
(20,966)
(19,215)
(10,394)
(9,402)
(9,774)
(8,718)
(9,199)
(8,084)
(8,641)
(7,483)
$ (704)
$ 2,972

Exhibit 11
SLATKA TOOL AND MOLD CORPORATION
Rate of Return, Bank Financing vs. Leasing
Bank Financing Better/
(W orse) than Leasing
Year Line 8, Exhibit 9
$ 11,314
1961
13,575
1962
11,735
1963
10,294
1964
3,778
1965
(20,177)
1966
(8,544)
1967
(8,798)
1968
(9,053)
1969
(2,243)
1970*
Totals** $

1,881

Discount
1%
.990
.980
.971
.961
.951
.942
.933
.923
.914
.905

Factor
¼%
.998
.995
.993
.990
.988
.985
.983
.980
.978
.975

Present Value
¼%
1%
$ 11,291
$ 11,201
13,507
13,304
11,653
11,395
10,191
9,893
3,733
3,593
(19,874)
(19,007)
(8,399)
(7,972)
(8,622)
(8,121)
(8,854)
(8,274)
(2,187)
(2,030)
$
2,439
$ 3,982

*1970: ($9,107) — minimum scrapping proceeds $6,864 = ($2,243).
**Total: ($4,983) — minimum scrapping proceeds $6,864 = $1,881.
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each alternative’s inflows and outflows. For bank financing vs. install
ment purchase (Exhibit 10), for example, he found that assigning a
time value of about 3.8 per cent to cash flows was sufficient to wipe out
bank financing’s apparent cost disadvantage of $12,000, i.e., at that
rate the fact that later outflows exceeded earlier inflows was (or could
be) compensated for in effect by putting the earlier inflows to work at
3.8 per cent net, which Fisher felt was clearly possible, or if not pos
sible, was so marginal as to make the actual timing and magnitude of
the actual flows, particularly in the first five years, of prime importance.
In the case of bank financing vs. leasing (Exhibit 11), Fisher noted
that bank financing was better than leasing on an absolute basis (after
taking credit for the minimum proceeds from scrapping the equipment,
i.e., the tax shield if net sale proceeds were realized). This meant that
the leasing alternative could only be better on a present value basis if
there were a negative time value to money because of the pattern of
cash flows, with other inflows coming first. (The trials of 1 per cent
and ¼ per cent shown on the exhibit were not necessary to bring
out this fact, but are shown in order to demonstrate that a positive
interest rate would not equate the cash flows; inspection of the “better/
(worse) ” column would indicate that only negative interest rate would
increase the values for 1966-1970 sufficiently to offset 1961 to 1965.)
Fisher felt that this analysis clearly indicated the superiority of bank
financing as against leasing, but also felt that the concept of a negative
interest rate was too unwieldy and esoteric to bring into a discussion
with Ostle, particularly since a subjective appraisal of the facts, i.e.,
the cash flow, gave a clear indication of the preferable decision. Fisher,
therefore, filed his present value work papers and decided to restrict
his discussion with Ostle to cash flow data. He called Ostle and told
him that he had completed the analysis of the three alternatives and
now wanted to discuss them with him. An appointment was made for
early the following week.
Second Meeting with Ostle

Fisher took copies of all of the schedules to his meeting with Ostle
and started out by reviewing the summary figures in Exhibit 8. He
stated as his preliminary conclusion that, in terms of cost, the install
ment purchase alternative was more preferable than the bank finance
alternative and, lastly, the lease plan (Exhibit 8). This ranking was
solely on the basis of minimum total cost. Fisher pointed out to Ostle
that the installment purchase came out so well in the comparison be
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cause it covered only five years, so that interest payments were mini
mized, whereas the bank loan and the lease were each for ten years.
He stressed that each alternative, in effect, provided a different amount
of financing.
Fisher next turned to the more detailed cash flow comparison be
tween the alternatives (Exhibit 9). He had already pointed out that
the installment purchase was preferable to the bank financed purchase
in terms of cost, so the next step was to see whether the company
could meet the annual commitments under the installment proposal.
Line 3 on Exhibit 9 indicated that in the first five years the installment
plan called for cash outlays of from $10,000 to $15,000 per year more
than the bank deal. The question was whether the company could
sustain these additional outlays in order to save $12,000 (difference
between bank and installment totals, line 3, Exhibit 9; or totals, Ex
hibit 8). If this were not possible, then Exhibit 8 indicated a close
choice on a cost basis between bank financing or leasing (depending
on the value assigned to the equipment after ten years; the lower the
value, the closer the net costs). Thus the choice between bank financ
ing and leasing could actually be made on the basis of convenience of
cash flows. The two alternatives are compared on line 8 of Exhibit 9.
Fisher stated that this comparison was clearly in favor of the bank
financing alternative, since the latter required at least $10,000 less per
year in the first four years; the pendulum swung the other way, mark
edly, in year six and leveled off in years seven to ten. On the basis
that for approximately equivalent total net costs, the preferable al
ternative is the one with the highest cash outflow in the later years,
Fisher indicated that bank financing was clearly more favorable.
There remained the earlier question of whether Slatka could afford
the heavy early cash flow of the installment purchase alternative, and
Fisher and Ostle discussed this at some length. First they reviewed
Slatka’s cash position and forecasts, and the likely cash need for work
ing capital if sales volume grew. Then they examined Slatka’s de
preciation cash flow and regular capital investment program, both
historically and prospectively. It turned out that normal replacement
of small and medium sized machinery and machine tools tended to
run between 85 per cent and 115 per cent of annual depreciation, and
Ostle knew of no reason why this percentage should move to a lower
level in the near future.
The overall conclusion was that Slatka’s cash position and prospects
did not seem sufficient to cover the excess of the installment alterna
tive cash flow over the bank financed alternative. In fact, Ostle
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pointed out that merely meeting the revised commitment to the bank
would itself place a significant (though tolerable) burden on Slatka’s
cash flow. Privately Fisher realized that if Ostle had come out in
favor of the installment purchase (i.e., if he felt the company could
have financed the extra cash needs) he then would have had to lead
Ostle through the present value analysis to show him that bank financ
ing was in fact a better alternative.
After some further discussion, Ostle finally decided that the revision
of his bank loan would best meet the repayment capabilities of his
company, and Fisher said that he agreed with Ostle’s conclusion. As
Fisher left to return to his office, Ostle remarked that he was very
grateful to Fisher for his thorough analysis of the problem.
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Worcester Bowl, Inc.
On Thursday morning, April 6 , 1962, Mr. David Chamberlain, CPA, a
partner of the firm of Hoagland, Weston, Hintz & Co., received a tele
phone call from Mr. Les Grant of Worcester Bowl, Inc., a client. After
the usual exchange of pleasantries, Mr. Grant told Mr. Chamberlain
that he had received a visit on the previous day from a representative
of Triangle Tenpins, Inc. (“T T P ”), owners of the automatic pinsetting
equipment that Mr. Grant had under lease. The TTP representative
had called on Mr. Grant to explain to him the terms of a general offer
that TTP was making to all its lessees, under which they were to be
given the opportunity of purchasing the automatic pinsetting equip
ment that they were leasing. As Mr. Chamberlain knew, it had previ
ously been TTP’s policy to make its pinsetters available only on a lease
basis. By their recent announcement, however, this policy was now to
be changed; new equipment would be offered either for sale or for
lease, and, for a limited time only, TTP was offering their present
lessees the opportunity to purchase their existing equipment at re
duced prices. Mr. Grant said that the TTP representative who had
called on him had explained that he was being sent to all TTP lessees
in the area to explain the terms of TTP’s offer to them in detail, to
answ er any questions they m ight have about it, and to initiate ap

propriate action if any lessee wished to avail himself of the offer.
Mr. Grant told Mr. Chamberlain that certain aspects of the offer
attracted him, but that he was not sure that he was taking all the fac
tors into account correctly. He asked Mr. Chamberlain if his firm
could review the problem, and if they would advise him how to re
spond to TTP’s offer. Mr. Chamberlain replied that he would be glad
to take a look at the problem, and suggested that Mr. Grant come in
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at his earliest convenience for a meeting with him to discuss the matter
in more detail. Mr. Grant agreed to do this and he made an appoint
ment to call at Mr. Chamberlain’s office the following day.
Hoagland, Weston, Hintz & Company

Mr. Chamberlain was one of the four partners in the firm of Hoag
land, Weston, Hintz & Co. of Cleveland, Ohio. The firm served a great
many medium and small sized businesses in Cleveland and neighbor
ing areas. A separate management services department had been set
up in 1956, and by 1962 accounted for approximately 15 per cent of
the total personnel. The department’s prime function was to provide
specialized personnel for major management services engagements.
Minor non-audit projects for clients were normally handled by the
audit staff, under the direction of the partners in charge of the respec
tive clients. Mr. Chamberlain had been brought up in Wooster, Ohio,
and had known Les Grant’s father when he operated the Worcester
Bowling Alley, the predecessor to Worcester Bowl, Inc. (The spelling
was anglicized deliberately, as a promotional device.) Mr. Chamberlain had brought Worcester Bowl, Inc. to the firm as a new client
shortly after joining the firm in 1952.
Worcester Bowl, Inc.

Mr. Grant, the sole stockholder of Worcester Bowl, Inc., had ap
proached Mr. Chamberlain in 1952 with the request that his firm take
over his accounting and audit work. Up to that time Mr. Grant had
been retaining the services of an elderly bookkeeper for the annual
preparation of income tax returns, based on data that Mr. Grant kept
during the year on a series of 5 x 7 cards. Upon the death of his book
keeper, Mr. Grant decided that the time had come for the institution
of a formal accounting system and the preparation of regular financial
reports. Mr. Chamberlain had accepted the assignment, and had set
up a simple accounting system for Mr. Grant that supplied all the
latter’s stated needs. A staff man visited Worcester Bowl, Inc. four
times a year to do some audit work and to review quarterly financial
results with Mr. Grant. As far as Mr. Chamberlain knew, Mr. Grant
was perfectly satisfied with the service he was receiving under this
arrangement and the fee that he was paying for it.
Mr. Grant had taken over management of Worcester Bowl, Inc.
from his father in the late 1940’s. The company had actually been in
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operation since 1923, always in the same location, in an old building
owned by Mr. Grant, Sr., on South Main Street in Wooster. When the
alleys had first been opened, the location was just south of a develop
ing area on the outskirts of the town. Over the years, the neighbor
hood had deteriorated, however, and in 1962 it was occupied mainly
by small industrial establishments, small stores and relatively poor
low-income housing. Mr. Grant had once told Mr. Chamberlain that
despite the change in the neighborhood over the period that he had
known it, he had no intention whatsoever of moving his business
to another location. It was a well established fixture in the neighbor
hood, and drew a large proportion of its clientele from men who
worked or lived relatively close by.
Balance sheets for Worcester Bowl, Inc. as of August 31, 1961 and
1960 are shown in Exhibit 1, page 101. Detailed income statements
for the fiscal years ended on those dates and for the seven-month
periods ended March 31, 1962 and 1961 are shown in Exhibit 2, pages
102-103. Abbreviated income statements for the fiscal years 1956
through 1959 are shown in Exhibit 3, page 104. Operating statistics for
the fiscal years 1961 and 1960 and for the seven-month periods ended
March 31, 1960 through 1962 are shown in Exhibit 4, page 105.
Mr. Grant’s Visit

At 2:30 p.m. the following day, Mr. Grant arrived at Mr. Chamber
lain’s office. The latter was waiting for him, along with Mr John Hamp
ton, a staff man who had worked on the Worcester Bowl, Inc. audit.
Mr. Grant immediately set about explaining to Mr. Chamberlain and
Mr. Hampton the dimensions of the problem that he was trying to
solve.
Mr. Grant:
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As you know, gentlemen, the first few years after
I took over from my father, I spent most of the
time and a fair amount of money getting the
place cleaned up and modernized. Then, in the
summer of 1954, I signed up with Triangle Ten
pins, Inc. for them to install thirty pinsetting ma
chines. The machines hadn’t been out on the
market for very long then, and I was pretty glad
to get them. My place was the first in Wooster to
have automatic pinsetters. I’m sure you remember
the way bowling alleys were run in the old days,
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Exhibit 1
WORCESTER BOWL, INC.
Balance Sheet
August 31, 1961 and 1960
ASSETS
Current assets
Cash ..................................................
Deposits .............................................
Interest receivable ...........................
Prepayments ....................................
Total current assets .....................
Notes receivable (estate Wm. Grant)
Fixed assets
Land—at cost ...................................
Furniture, fixtures &
equipment at cost .......................
Less depreciation .........................

$42,748
24,676

Leased property improvements
at c o s t.............................................
Less depreciation .........................

$62,112
36,932

Fixed assets, net ...........................
Other assets
Cash value, life insurance ...............

1961

1960

$

843
200
766
1,760
$ 3,569
13,000

$ 3,101
200
766
___ 830
$ 4,897
13,000

$15,298

$15,298

18,072

25,180
$58,550

$35,394
20,121
$60,036
32,009

2,694

LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY
Current liabilities
Accounts payable
$ 8,408
Current account, L. Grant
10,190
Federal income taxes .......................
1,109
Other taxes payable
892
Total current liabilities
Stockholders’ Equity
Common stock .................................
Retained earnings
Beginning of year
Net retained, current year
Total stockholders’ equity
Total liabilities and equity

$ 5,735
1,479

28,027
$58,598
2,222
$78,717

$77,813

Total assets ..............................................

15,273

$20,599

$13,306
6,852
1,935
889
$22,982

$50,000

$50,000

7,214

$ 4,862
873

5,735

$57,214

$55,735

$77,813

$78,717
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Exhibit 2
WORCESTER BOWL, INC.
Statements of Income
For the Years Ended August 31, 1960 and 1961,
And for the Seven Months Ended March 31, 1961 and 1962

Bowling fees: league
Bowling fees: open .......
Bowling fees: school .....
Bowling fees: tournament
Sales—merchandise .......
Sales—other .....................
Rental received
Miscellaneous .................
Gross Income .............
Advertising—television ..
Advertising—other .........
Purchases .........................
Depreciation fixtures
and fittings .....................
Amortization of leased
property improvements .
Donations .......................
Dues and subscriptions ..
Insurance .........................
Telephone .........................
Light .................................
H e a t ...................................
W ater ...............................
Legal and accounting .. .
M iscellaneous...................
Rental—equipment .......
Rental—building .............
Rental—parking lot .......
Repairs—bowling
equipment .....................
Repairs—other equipment
Repairs—building ...........
Repairs—other .................
Salary—employees .........
Salary—officers ...............
Supplies—pins .................
Supplies—other ...............
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Years Ended
August 31
1961
1960
$ 98,833
$101,904
46,126
65,954
4,145
5,584
16,953
13,338
3,934
5,930
5,366
7,285
7,000
7,000
370
—
$182,357
$207,365
$
635
$ 5,749
4,119
4,377
3,335
5,051

7 Months Ended
March 31
1962
1961
$ 74,668
$ 82,013
31,683
34,296
6,703
2,923
11,192
11,437
3,580
2,864
3,656
4,163
6,125
6,125
12
339
$137,619
$ 1,089
4,006
3,023

$144,160
—
$ 2,447
2,403

6,284

5,190

3,500

3,010

4,923
310
1,281
4,602
728
7,192
1,609
1,226
1,071
176
31,533
12,000
2,754

3,620
330
1,637
3,143
724
8,025
1,405
472
1,285
209
34,067
12,000
2,748

2,800
200
1,429
3,319
452
4,267
1,143
334
620
—
23,932
10,500
2,279

2,100
310
1,023
4,833
416
4,503
1,611
802
781
158
23,985
10,200
2,265

1,642
(928)
277
906
39,372
35,528
5,954
9,419

4,153
3,161
5,177
84
40,057
40,194
7,242
10,817

584
211
—
9
21,146
21,000
6,999
6,944

1,142
711
(1,236)
1,368
25,359
28,500
5,566
6,152
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Exhibit 2, continued
Years Ended
August 31
1961
Taxes (other than
on income) .....................
Travel ...............................
Total Expenses .......
Operating profit ...............
Other income* (net) .....
Provisions for income tax
Net profit after taxes .....
Net profit before taxes

3,992
270
$180,210

7 Months Ended
March 31

1960
3,785
1,416
$206,118

$ 2,147
432
(1,100)

$

1,247
376
(750)

$

$

873

1,479

1962

1961

2,405
11
$122,202

2,063
10
$130,482

$ 15,417
8

$ 13,678
(98)

$ 15,425

$ 13,580

*Mainly interest.

Mr. Grant
(continued)

and the rather unfavorable image they had. Well,
automatic pinsetting equipment changed all that,
along with the modernization of the alleys that
usually accompanied installation. The game be
came faster and easier to play, and the alleys
became more attractive socially, and cheaper to
operate. The whole picture changed for the better
—not just for us, but for the whole industry. I
signed up for the TTP’s standard lease, which ran
for a period of ten years from September 1, 1954.
Under the terms of the lease, I had to pay all
maintenance and operating expenses, and all state
and local property taxes on the machines. In ad
dition, I paid a rental of 10 cents per line on the
first 8,000 lines on each machine each year,
plus an additional 8 cents per line for the next
4,000 lines and 5 cents per line on the next 3,000
lines. There was an $800 minimum per machine
p er year, i.e., I paid for 8,000 lines a year, w hether

I used them or not. Also, there was some provision
about getting lines above 15,000 per machine per
year free, but I never even came close to that total.
My agreement also included a provision that after
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M r. G rant

I had paid for an average of 150,000 lines per m a

(continued)

chine in the house, that is for 4,500,000 lines in
total, I would have completed my contract, and
would then be given the opportunity to continue
my lease on an annual basis at 6 cents per line. Up
to the end of last month, I had accumulated a total
of just under 2.8 million lines, so I am not too close

Exhibit 3
WORCESTER BOWL, INC.
Abbreviated Income Statements
For the Years Ended August 31, 1956-1959

Bowling fees—league ..
Bowling fees—other
Sales and re n ta ls.........

1959
$ 97,348
66,209
19,690

1958
$116,561
53,859
20,547

Gross Income .........

$183,247

$190,967

1957
$131,746
58,787
25,680
$216,213

Salaries and wages .....
$ 69,444
Rental—equipment . ..
31,741
Rental—other .............
14,748
Depreciation ...............
14,220
Purchases—merchandise
and supplies...............
21,565
Repairs and
m aintenance...............
8,109
A dvertising...................
7,807
U tilities.........................
8,467
Taxes and licenses.......
3,471
Dues and subscriptions
1,330
Insurance .....................
3,205
Travel ...........................
1,190
Legal and accounting .
2,478
602
Miscellaneous .............
Total Expenses .......
$188,377
Profit (loss)
before taxes ...............
$ (5,130)
Previous year
adjustment (net) .....
(360)
Provision for income tax

$ 71,777
33,844
16,566
16,894

$ 64,367
40,533
14,160
17,628

$197,468
$ 49,080
41,080
14,160
16,315

25,659

19,815

30,600

6,652
9,756
8,941
3,630
937
3,166
1,322
568
283
$199,995

4,256
5,629
9,491
4,016
1,219
3,377
2,487
350
1,641
$188,969

7,192
5,552
9,194
2,831
1,179
2,776
2,891
475
2,817
$186,142

$ (9,028)

$ 27,244

$ 11,326

Net profit (loss)
after taxes .................
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$ (5,490)

6,165
(2,143)
$ (5,006)

(12,155)
$ 15,089

1956
$112,182
56,734
28,552

(5,258)
$ 6,068

2,508,556

Total games chargeable to d a te * * ...............................

2,189,008

384,398

386,937

6,191

27,122

18,348

132,371

202,905

1,804,610

1960

243,462

256,867

2,829

21,326

19,110

63,892

149,710

2,508,556

1962

252,928

268,092

2,662

22,934

12,942

68,574

160,980

2,189,008

1961

281,988

295,110

4,346

25,340

11,401

93,951

160,072

1,804,610

1960

7 Months Ended
____________March 31_____________

* Totals recorded and chargeable differ because the latter are computed on the basis of 10.5 frames per game, whereas
Worcester Bowl’s average ran consistently lower.
** Rental is paid on number of games chargeable.

319,548

Games chargeable*,** ...................................................

33,284

T ournam ent.................................................................
3,373

16,763

School...........................................................................

340,279

92,297

Open ...........................................................................

Total recorded* .........................................................

194,562

Games recorded during current period:
League .........................................................................

Free .............................................................................

2,189,008

Cumulative total games to previous August 31 ...........

1961

Years Ended
August 31

WORCESTER BOWL, INC.
Operating Statistics
For the Years Ended August 31, 1960 and 1961, and for the
Seven Months Ended March 3 1 , 1960,1961 and 1962
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Mr. Grant
(continued)
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to that completion total, and of course my lease
only runs for two more years now, to August 31,
1964. Under my lease, I am entitled to new ma
chines, at no installation charge, at the end of the
lease period, provided that I sign a new lease under
their current terms.
Now it seems as though they’ve got this big
drive on to let lessees buy the machines that they
are operating. It works this way. They’ll let me
purchase the machines at their net depreciated
cost. They are calculating this on the basis of an
original cost of $8,450 per pinsetter, less 10 per cent
straight line depreciation for each year since in
stallation. The minimum price per machine is
$2,000 and the reason this fellow of their’s came
in to see me was that he said he had calculated
that the depreciated price of my machines would
reach the $2,000 minimum just before the end of
this month. So there it is. I don’t know whether
it’s a good deal or not, although I think it probably
is. After all, I have been paying them over $30,000
a year in rental on my pinsetters under the present
arrangement, and I only have to pay $60,000 to
acquire them outright. The only thing is, I don’t
have $60,000. As you know, I’ve been taking out
nearly all the earnings of the business as my salary
and bonus, because I have to pay off my father’s
estate for his stock in the company that I bought
when he died. TTP said they are prepared to give
me ninety days credit in paying the purchase price,
but no more. And they said they’d allow me a 3
per cent discount if payment is made on signing of
the purchase contract. So if I go in for this deal,
I’ll have to raise $60,000 at some stage, and I might
as well get it now rather than in three months’
time, because I’ll get the discount from TTP which,
I am certain, will be more than the interest I’d
pay over the next three months. So you see,
gentlemen, if you think this is a good deal for me,
I want to ask your advice as to how I go about
financing it too.
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Mr. Chamberlain: Well, Les, let’s take these things one at a time.
First, I know you feel committed to your present
location, but in reviewing your statements for the
last few years I notice that your volume has been
declining. Now this raises questions at two levels.
First, maybe this is a good time to reconsider your
decision to say on South Main, and second, if you
do stay, what do you think will happen to your
volume during the next few years? This last ques
tion is important, because right now you only
have to pay TTP for games actually bowled.
Mr. Grant:

It seems to me I’ve got to stay where I am. If I
opened new alleys in another location I would lose
any advantage I may have over all the other new
operators that are crowding into this business.
There are 130 bowling lanes in Wooster right now,
and a new 40-lane house is supposed to be in opera
tion by fall. In addition, I’ve heard that the con
struction contract has been let on a new 32-lane
house that is expected to open in approximately a
year. Even without these two major additions,
Wooster already has the national average of bowl
ing lanes per capita, so you can see that competi
tion is going to get tougher.
Now, I don’t think I’ll have to compete on a price
basis—we won’t have any sort of a price war—but
I do think that having a well-established location
will be an important competitive advantage. Even
so, I guess I’ll have to admit that my lineage may
drop by 10 per cent a year for the next two or
three years before the competitive situation
straightens out.

Mr. Chamberlain: I think what you say sounds reasonable, and it
also points up how important this decision is. If
competition is going to get rougher, you can’t af
ford not to get your equipment as cheaply as pos
sible.
Another thing we’ve got to consider is how long
these machines will last. They’re already eight
years old, and your existing lease under TTP
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Mr. Chamberlain would plan to replace them in a couple of years.
(continued)
Have there been any improvements in this kind of
equipment since 1954?
Mr. Grant:

Sure, there’ve been minor modifications every
couple of years or so, but I’ve always kept my
machines up to date by paying TTP to install the
new features on my machines. That’s why repair
expenses jump around from year to year. These
developments are quite unpredictable—you never
know when they’re coming. But I always took
them when they were available.
My machines are in good shape. Eventually
they’ll probably get so old that the maintenance
costs would eat me up if I didn’t replace them, but
I would guess that they’d last for another five years
anyway.

Mr. Hampton:

That raises an interesting question, doesn’t it?
W hat happens after five years? If you lease from
TTP you get new machines free every ten years
but if you had to buy new machines it would re
quire a lot of capital. Do you know what the
selling price is on new machines?

Mr. Grant:

It hasn’t changed much. I think they would cost
about $8,600 each, installed.

Mr. Hampton:

That’s better than a quarter of a million dollars.
You’d really have financing problems then.

Mr. Grant:

Well, it’s awfully hard to see more than five years
down the road. Maybe I could buy these now and
then lease the new ones on another contract from
TTP. I’ll have to cross that bridge when I come to
it.

Mr. Chamberlain: I agree with you, except that looking at the longer
range problem may help to bring the current prob
lem into focus. I’d like to think about it a little,
anyway.
Finally, one of the things we’ve got to consider
here is the problem of income taxes. If you buy
the equipment you’ll have to depreciate it over
several years. Considering that it’s already eight
108
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years old, I’d guess that a five-year depreciable life
would be allowable. We would probably use ac
celerated depreciation, to obtain the maximum tax
benefit and cash flow.
Your corporation hasn’t paid much in taxes in
recent years. However, the elimination of your
rental payments to TTP may mean that the corpo
ration will show a taxable profit. If so, corporate
income taxes equal to 30 per cent of the
first $25,000 of profits will be an additional cash
drain. In other words, you won’t save the entire
amount of your rental payments if you buy the
machines because your income taxes will increase.
Now, pulling all this together, the answer is not
as obvious as it first appears. Superficially, it looks
like you could get your $60,000 back in just two
years, because you’ve been paying TTP over $30,
000 per year. But your volume is dropping, which
means your payments to TTP will be lower, and
you’ll probably have some income taxes to pay.
Also, you’ll be using older equipment than any of
your competitors.
Even if you do decide to purchase the machines,
financing them will be the key to the deal. So, it’ll
probably be worthwhile for us to work out some
projections, both to help you decide what to do
and to show to the bank if you decide to go
ahead with the purchase. Why don’t you let us
work with these figures and see what we can come
up with. Suppose I give you a call the first of next
week.
Mr. Grant agreed to Mr. Chamberlain’s suggestions, and after dis
cussing some other matters for a few moments, he left.
Questions

1. Analyze the data in the case and prepare a projection of operat
ing results and cash flow for Worcester Bowl, Inc. W hat do you think
the company’s operating expenses will be in the face of the declining
volume? How much cash will be available to finance the purchase of
the existing equipment?
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2. Recast your analysis in a form suitable for presenting the salient
facts to a banker or other potential source of financing for this
transaction.
3. How would you advise Mr. Grant if he were your client?
COMMENTARY ON WORCESTER BOWL, INC.

On Monday morning, April 16, 1962, Mr. David Chamberlain tele
phoned his client, Les Grant, President of Worcester Bowl, Inc., and
made an appointment to visit him with John Hampton the next day.
Mr. Chamberlain said that Hampton had worked out some projections
which he thought Mr. Grant would find helpful in deciding whether
or not to purchase his pinsetting equipment from Triangle Tenpins,
Inc.
Chamberlain & Hampton arrived at Mr. Grant’s office at about
11:30 a.m., and the following discussion took place.
Mr. Hampton:
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Les, I think these projections I’ve worked up bring
the problem into focus pretty clearly. My figures
show that you will have a little better than $20,000
available each year to repay the loans that you are
going to need, but these figures are based on a
whole series of assumptions and estimates that I’ve
made. Therefore, I would like to go down this
work sheet (Table 1, pages 111-112) with you
rather carefully so that you’ll understand just what
these figures mean.
To start off with, I wanted to allow for the fact
that you expect your volume to decline during the
next two or three years. Each column of this work
sheet represents a twelve-month period beginning
April 1, 1962. Using your actual volume figures for
the first seven months of this fiscal year, I esti
mated that your volume is currently running at an
annual rate of 331,000 games per year. I then
estimated that your volume during the next twelve
months would be only 90 per cent of that, or about
300,000 games. The volume during the second
year is projected to be about 90 per cent of the
first year’s volume, and the volume during the third
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and subsequent years is projected at 95 per cent
of the second year’s volume.
The top half of this work sheet shows what your
profits would be if you continue to lease your
machines from TTP. Historically, you have had to
pay TTP for only about 95 per cent of the games
recorded, and I’ve shown the estimated number of
Table 1
WORCESTER BOWL, INC.
Projected Cash Flow from Operations
Leasing vs. Owning Existing Machines
First
Year
Operations W ith Leased Machines
Number of games recorded ...............
Number of games chargeable (95% )
Bowling fees @ 48¢ per
recorded game ...................................
Sales and rentals @ 12% of
bowling fees .......................................
Gross income ...............................
Operating expenses:
Miscellaneous cash expenses—
65% of fees ...................................
Equipment rental:
100 per game on first
240,000 ( minimum) .................
80 per game on remaining .........
Total rental payments ...........
Total cash expenses ...................
Depreciation and amortization

Second Third Year and
Year
Subsequent

300,000
285,000

270,000
256,500

257,000
244,200

$144,000

$130,000

$123,400

17,300
$161,300

15,600
$145,600

14,800
$138,200

$ 93,600

$ 84,500

$ 80,200

$ 24,000 $ 24,000
1,400
3,600
$ 27,600 $ 25,400
$121,200 $109,900
10,000
10,000

$ 24,000
300
$ 24,300

Total expenses .............................
Operating profit before
owner’s salary ...................................
Owner’s salary .....................................
Taxable p ro fit.......................................
Income tax @ 30% .............................

$131,200

$119,900

$104,500
10,000
$114,500

$ 30,100
30,000
$
100
30

Profit after taxes .................................

$

$ 25,700
25,000
$
700
200
$
500

$ 23,700
23,000
$
700
200
$
500

70
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Table 1, continued

Operations W ith Owned Machines
Gross revenue .....................................

First
Year

Second
Year

Third Year and
Subsequent

$161,300

$145,600

$138,200

Operating expenses:
Miscellaneous cash expenses .........
Owner’s salary .................................
Depreciation: pinsetting equipment
other .........................
Total expenses .............................
Operating profit before taxes ...........
Income tax at 30% .............................
Profit after taxes .................................
Add back—equipment depreciation .

$ 93,600 $ 84,500
30,000
25,000
12,000
12,000
10,000
10,000

$ 80,200
23,000
12,000
10,000

$145,600
$ 15,700
4,700
$ 11,000
12,000

$131,500
$ 14,100
4,200
$ 9,900
12,000

$125,200
$ 13,000
3,900
$ 9,100
12,000

Cash available for equipment
financing .............................................

$ 23,000

$ 21,900

$ 21,100

Mr. Hampton
(continued)
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chargeable games on the second line of this work
sheet.
The next thing I did was to analyze your reve
nue for the last several years. Revenue from bowl
ing fees has been fairly constant at 48 cents per
game, and that’s the estimate I used. Revenue
from sales and rentals, stated as a percentage of
the revenue from bowling fees, has been declining
rather steadily. It amounted to 17 per cent of
bowling fees in 1956, and only 10 per cent in 1961.
I estimated that this source of revenue would
amount to 12 per cent of bowling fees in the future.
The next problem was to try to project what your
operating expenses would be at the lower volume
that we are projecting. This work sheet (Table 2,
page 113) shows the sequence of my analysis.
First I calculated your total expenses as a percent
age of bowling fees for each of the last six years.
These numbers are not too meaningful because
other sources of revenue have been ignored, and,
of course, you have been taking out a large salary.

108%
$ 31.5
$148.7

Per cent of f e e s .............................................................

Equipment rentals .......................................................................

Expenses net of ren tals .................................................................
$ 11.2
$137.5
83%
$ 34.9
$102.6
62%

Depreciation and am ortization ...................................................

Expenses net of rentals and depreciation ...................................

Per cent of fe e s ...............................................................

Salaries in excess of $40,000 .........................................................

Expenses net of rentals, depreciation and owner’s sa la ry .........

Per cent of fe e s ...............................................................

90%

$180.2

Total expenses...............................................................................

Per cent of fe e s ....................................................................

$166.1

Total bowling fees .......................................................................

1961

66%

$122.9

$ 40.3

87%

$163.2

$ 8.8

92%

$172.0

$ 34.1

110%

$206.1

$186.8

I960

WORCESTER BOWL, INC.
Analysis of Cash Operating Expenses
( In Thousands of Dollars)

69%

$113.1

$ 29.4

87%

$142.5

$ 14.2

96%

$156.7

$ 31.7

115%

$188.4

$163.6

1959

69%

$117.5

$ 31.8

88%

$149.3

$ 16.9

98%

$166.2

$ 33.8

117%

$200.0

$170.4

1958

56%

$106.5

$ 24.4

69%

$130.9

$ 17.6

78%

$148.5

$ 40.5

99%

$189.0

$190.5

1957

71%

$119.6

$ 9.1

76%

$128.7

$ 16.3

86%

$145.0

$ 41.1

110%

$186.1

$168.9

1956

Table 2
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Mr. Hampton
(continued)

Working down the expenses, the first thing I did
was to subtract the equipment rentals and the
charge for depreciation and amortization. Operat
ing expenses net of these two items have been a
fairly constant percentage of bowling fees during
the last four years. Finally, I eliminated all salaries
and wages in excess of $40,000 per year. The
excess is approximately the amount you have been
drawing out as salary, and I wanted to use your
salary as a floating factor in the projection. As
you can see on the last line of this work sheet, net
cash operating costs have ranged from 62 per cent
to 69 per cent of bowling fees during the last four
years.
Now this is a crucial point. It’s very hard to pro
ject what these expenses will be in the future be
cause many of them do not vary in direct propor
tion to your volume of business. Nevertheless, you
must make a strenuous effort to keep these ex
penses in line as your volume declines, and I have
estimated that these expenses will amount to only
65 per cent of your bowling fees during the next
few years. As you can see by referring back to the
first work sheet, this means that you are going to
have to cut these costs pretty substantially by the
third year. Does that seem reasonable?

Mr. Grant:

Well, it’s not going to be easy. Some of my ex
penses, like bowling pins and other supplies, would
be lower at a reduced volume, but I certainly can’t
cut my expenses for the telephone or other utilities.
The real nub of it is whether or not I’ll be able to
get by with less help. I may have to lay off a
couple of m y full-tim e salaried people and use

part-time help just during the busiest hours. The
way you put it, I really don’t have any choice; I’m
going to have to cut my expenses back as I start
to lose volume.
Mr. Hampton:
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Okay, let’s let the 65 per cent figure stand, at this
point anyway. The rest of the calculations on this
work sheet are fairly straightforward. I computed
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what your equipment rental would be, and de
ducted it. I also deducted a constant $10,000 per
year for depreciation and amortization. This left
you with a figure of operating profit before deduct
ing your salary, and I then applied practically all
of it as salary for you. As you can see, your salary
will have to drop during the next few years to
$30,000 next year, $25,000 the year after, and
$23,000 from then on. On that basis, the corpora
tion would continue to be approximately a break
even operation.
Next, in the lower half of this work sheet, I have
figured out what would happen if you purchased
the equipment from TTP this month. All the fig
ures are the same as those used for the leasing
projection, except that you don’t pay any equip
ment rental and you do have a $12,000 item each
year for depreciation. I used straight line deprecia
tion in the example for simplicity’s sake. Actually,
we could improve the cash flow in the first two
years by about $2,000 in total by using accelerated
depreciation but this would not significantly affect
our conclusions. The corporation would show a
fairly substantial taxable profit, and after paying
income taxes, would still have about $10,000 per
year left.
In order to figure what total cash available for
equipment financing would be, I then added back
the depreciation charge on the equipment because
you actually wouldn’t be paying that money to
anybody. The same thing is true of your other
depreciation expense of $10,000 per year, but
you’re going to need that money for the normal
replacement of your other equipment. In terms of
the pinsetting equipment alone, the amount of
cash available will be $23,000 during the first year
and slightly less than that during subsequent years.
Mr. Grant:

Well, if I understand this, it will take me about
three years to get back the $60,000 I’d have to pay
to purchase the machines.
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Mr. Hampton:
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That’s right, although you must remember that
you’ll have to borrow the money, and there’ll be an
interest expense which has not been figured into
these calculations. So actually, it will take a little
more than three years before the machines will
have paid for themselves. Then you’ll own them
free and clear, and you’ll have an extra $21,000 of
cash each year until the machines have to be
replaced.
We ought to look at the question, “W hat hap
pens when the machines do have to be replaced?”
As you can see from the first work sheet, by the
time your volume finally levels off, your rental pay
ments to TTP are only $300 per year, total, for
thirty machines above the minimum of $800 per
machine. This means that you’ll only be paying
about $810 per year per machine, and you obvi
ously can’t afford to buy a new machine costing
more than $8,000 at that time when you can rent
it for only $800 a year. Even if the machines were
to last about fifteen years, it would probably be
cheaper to rent them because of the flexibility you
would have under the lease, and the fact that a
fifteen-year stream of $800 payments is a cheap
way to finance an $8,000 investment (equivalent
to a present value discount of about 5.5 per cent).
However, if it seems like a good idea to buy the
used machines now, I thought it might possibly be
better to buy new machines.
Just to test this out, I worked out some calcula
tions (Table 3, pages 118-119) to test out the profit
ability of buying new equipment right now. In
doing this, there was no point to assuming you
bought thirty new machines because that obviously
wouldn’t pay for itself. And at the volume levels
you are projecting, you probably won’t need thirty
machines. Three years from now you’ll probably
only be doing two-thirds of the volume you did in
1960, so I assumed that you would only purchase
twenty-four new pinsetters.
Using accelerated depreciation on the new
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equipment, the corporation would show a tax loss
for the first three years, but the loss carry-forward
would eliminate the need to pay any taxes until
the sixth year. The cash flow from the new ma
chines would be about $25,000 for the first six
years, and then drop to about $20,000 per year.
Considering the fact that twenty-four new ma
chines would cost a little more than $200,000, it
seems to me that the payoff is just not fast enough
to make purchasing them worthwhile.
Mr. Grant:
To make it even worse, John, I can’t accept your
assumption that I would buy only twenty-four new
pinsetters. While my volume might well drop off
to the point where twenty-four machines would
have the theoretical capacity to meet the demand,
the fact is that I have to maintain thirty machines
because with fewer I would lose a substantial por
tion of my league play. In other words, I need to
have thirty lanes available, even if they’re not fully
used.
Also, as I said last week, I’m really not too con
cerned about what’s going to happen four or five
years from now because the business is changing
so rapidly. Certainly I would not buy new equip
ment today when I know that I am going to be
facing increasing competition. As I see it, buying
my present equipment seems to make pretty good
sense because, even if my volume continues to
fall, I can pay for it in a little over three years.
After that, if things don’t get any worse, I’ll be in
a better position to decide what to do next.
Let’s get to this question of financing. Do you
have any ideas on that, Dave?
Mr. Chamberlain: Well, I think the next step is for you to see Tom
Pratt, the loan officer who handles your account at
the Industrial National Bank. I think you ought
to check out his response to the idea of a $60,000
loan repayable over a four-year period. If you
wished, I would be glad to go with you as your
adviser, but, of course, I can’t make any decisions
for you. However, it might be helpful to go over
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Projected Operating and Cash Flow Statements
Leasing vs. Owning New Machines
First
Year

Second
Year

Third
Year

Gross re v e n u e ............................................

$161,300

$145,600

$138,200

Operating expenses:
Miscellaneous cash expenses................

$ 93,600

$ 84,500

$ 80,200

Owner’s salary ........................................

30,000

25,000

23,000

Depreciation:
Pinsetting equipm ent........................

41,300

33,000

26,400

Other ..................................................

10,000

10,000

10,000

Total expenses................................

$174,900

$152,500

$139,600

Operations with owned machines
(Assuming 24 new machines purchased
at $8,600 each, installed, and
depreciated over 10 years on
double declining balance)

Operating profit ( loss) before taxes....... $(13,600) $ (6,900) $ (1,400)
Income tax @ 3 0 % ....................................

—

—

—

Profit after ta x e s........................................ $(13,600) $ (6,900) $ (1,400)
41,300

33,000

26,400

Cash available for equipment financing... . $ 27,700

$ 26,100

$ 25,000

Add back-equipment depreciation..........
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Table 3

Fourth
Year

Fifth
Year

Sixth
Year

Seventh
Year

Eighth
Year

Ninth
Year

Tenth
Year

$138,200

$138,200

$138,200

$138,200

$138,200

$138,200

$138,200

$ 80,200

$ 80,200

$ 80,200

$ 80,200

$ 80,200

$ 80,200

$ 80,200

23,000

23,000

23,000

23,000

23,000

23,000

23,000

21,100

16,900

13,500

10,800

8,700

6,900

5,500

10,000

10,000

10,000

10,000

10,000

10,000

10,000

$134,300

$130,100

$126,700

$124,000

$121,900

$120,100

$118,700

$ 3,900

$ 8,100 $ 11,500* $ 14,200

$ 16,300

$ 18,100

$ 19,500

500

4,300

4,900

5,400

5,800

—

—

$ 3,900

$ 8,100

$ 11,000

$ 9,900

$ 11,400

$ 12,700

$ 13,700

21,000

16,900

13,500

10,800

8,700

6,900

5,500

$ 25,000

$ 25,000

$ 24,500

$ 20,700

$ 20,100

$ 19,600

$ 19,200

* Taxable profit in sixth year, after applying all loss carry-forwards, is $1,600.
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Mr. Chamberlain some of the arithmetic with Tom, if he wants to
see it, and again I would be glad to back you up.
(continued)
I personally have had quite a bit of contact with
Tom over the last several years, and I feel sure
that if anything can be worked out, Tom will take
good care of you.
Mr. Grant:

Fine. Just let me make a phone call to tell him
that I’ll be in to see him this afternoon, and then
we’ll get some lunch. I’d like to see him alone
first, and hold you in reserve, so to speak, if it seems
that I need your assistance.

Final Outcome

The next day Mr. Chamberlain received a telephone call from Mr.
Grant. He said that he had just come from his meeting with Mr.
Pratt of the bank, and that the two of them had tentatively agreed
on a loan arrangement. Mr. Grant said that the terms agreed upon
were slightly different from those that Mr. Chamberlain had sug
gested in his conversation with Mr. Grant the previous day.
Apparently, the bank was unwilling to extend a four-year loan to
Mr. Grant. Mr. Pratt had pointed out that the number of bowling
establishments in Wooster was increasing rather rapidly, and that Mr.
Grant’s financial statements had shown evidence of increasing compe
tition. Under the circumstances, the bank was prepared to make the
loan only for a shorter period than that requested. Mr. Grant said
that Mr. Pratt had suggested that the loan be repaid on the sum-ofyear’s-digits basis over a three-year period, that is, in the ratio of
3:2:1. In this way, one-half of the total loan would be repaid by the
end of the first year, thus materially reducing the risk from the bank’s
point of view. If this was acceptable to Mr. Grant, the bank would
consider making the loan. After reviewing the cash flow projections,
Mr. Pratt said that he realized that it would be difficult for Mr. Grant
to pay $30,000 on the principal of the note during the first year, but
that it should be possible if Grant delayed making other capital in
vestments and used some of his $10,000 of other depreciation funds to
pay back the loan. If necessary, Mr. Pratt said, Mr. Grant might even
consider reducing his salary during the first year in order to work off
part of the loan.
Mr. Pratt had told Mr. Grant that the bank would recognize the
annually reducing amount of risk in the loan by charging interest at
the following rates over the life of the loan: first year, 6 per cent on
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initial balance; second year, 5.5 per cent on the balance at the begin
ning of that year; third year, 5 per cent on the opening balance.
Mr. Grant said that on questioning Mr. Pratt further, it had turned
out that the latter was thinking in terms of monthly installments of
principal and interest. Mr. Grant had then pointed out that his busi
ness was of a highly seasonal nature, and that he could not commit
himself to making large payments over the summer months. He had
suggested to Mr. Pratt that the company repay the loan in proportion
to the rate it earned income. After some discussion, the two had
tentatively agreed that Worcester Bowl, Inc. would make monthly
payments on account of interest, and monthly principal repayments
calculated at the rate of 10 cents per bowling game recorded each
month. In effect, the principal repayments would be the identical
amount that would have been paid to Triangle Tenpins, Inc. as rental.
In consideration for agreeing to this proposal, Mr. Pratt had insisted
on Mr. Grant’s agreeing to make minimum annual total principal repay
ments in the amounts that he had originally proposed, i.e., $30,000,
$20,000 and $10,000 respectively, in the first, second and third years
(if the loan amount were $60,000).
Mr. Chamberlain told Mr. Grant that he thought that this revised
loan arrangement was very fair to both Mr. Grant and the bank. In
fact, he pointed out that since Mr. Grant’s principal payments would
be exactly equivalent to the rental that he was paying previously ( ex
cept for differences arising out of the drop from 10 cents to 8 cents per
game after 8,000 games had been recorded each year), in a way Mr.
Grant could view the arrangement as one where he continued paying
rentals as before, but would end up with the equipment as his own
property, free and clear, shortly after the time that the original lease
would have expired. (Of course, Mr. Grant’s tax position would be
changed.) Mr. Chamberlain concluded by telling Mr. Grant that
he could see no reason why Mr. Grant should not enter into the loan
agreement and purchase the equipment, if that was what he wanted
to do. Mr. Grant thanked Mr. Chamberlain for his and Mr. Hampton’s
advice and help, and said that he would think the matter over again,
and make up his mind before the end of the week. He promised to let
Mr. Chamberlain know what he decided to do.
Two days later, Mr. Chamberlain received another telephone call
from Mr. Grant. Mr. Grant told Mr. Chamberlain that he had decided
to go ahead with the plan as finally worked out, namely, to raise a loan
at the bank on the terms previously agreed upon, and to acquire the
pinsetting equipment from TTP at the end of the month.
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